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________________________Introduction_______________________ 
__________________Caught in the eye of a crow_________________ 
 
 
The crows know I’m dangerous.  
I realized this while the November sun set over a baseball field in Hanford, a small city in 
the Central Valley of California. Thousands of crows were flying to the city from disparate 
foraging locations to convene in a communal roost and prepare to sleep through the night. Many 
of them gathered in the short grass of this field. As I stood on the sidewalk outside the fence that 
surrounded the field, one of the crows closest to me turned its head and met my eyes. It held me 
in its gaze. It made a quiet vocalization—caaw. Another crow next to the first cocked its head 
and caught me in its eye. Suddenly, the first leapt into the air, followed by the second, and flew 
in my direction. They sounded a loud series of cwraaws craaws, caws. After hearing this signal, 
about a hundred crows who had been ambling about in the grass took off. Half of them flew to a 
tall oak tree on the edge of the field. The other half flew towards me. They drew circles above 
me in a cloud of beating wings and hailed me with a vociferous chorus of caaws.  I looked up. 
Each of the circling crows seemed to have an eye fixed on me. Under their gaze and their 
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interpellating calls, I blushed.1 You misunderstand me, I thought. It’s not me who’s dangerous! 
That’s what I thought then, but now I’m not so sure. 
  I had seen crows do this before, but in those cases, they had been collectively hazing a 
hawk. Now, the crows treated me as if I was an intruding hawk. With their vocal focus, they 
seemed to tell me something about who I was. You are dangerous. I wanted to tell them 
otherwise, but I couldn’t find the words.  
This was the third evening I had visited Hanford but it was the first in which I had 
received such an alarming reception. I had been to the same spot yesterday to watch the crows—
presumably a few of the same ones—convening in the field. But now it was different. I then 
made the connection that the crows must have already made: the crow who had recognized me 
had possibly seen me late last night patrolling the streets of Hanford with Elijah, a falconer, and 
his hawk Mars.2 Elijah had been hired to encourage the crows to change the location of their 
roost because, in the eyes of many residents and business owners in Hanford, the roosting 
crows—with their raucous calls and seemingly unlimited excrement—represented a pestilent 
nuisance. To do this, Elijah used his trained hawk to harass the crows so that they would learn 
that, if they wanted a peaceful night’s sleep, they should roost elsewhere. “Crows are 
intelligent,” Elijah told me, “but their intelligence is a double-edged sword.” They can learn 
about new dangers quickly and find ways to work around them, he said. But their capacity to 
learn is also why, “when we start marking a place with our hawks, the crows will pick up on it” 
and move elsewhere.3 Hence the double edge.  
                                                 
1
 See Haraway (2003, 17) for more on how Althusser’s theory of interpellation relates to nonhuman animals: 
“Subjects are constituted from concrete individuals by being ‘hailed’ through ideology into their subject positions in 
the modern state. Today, through our ideologically loaded narratives of their lives, animals ‘hail’ us to account for 
the regimes in which they and we must live.” 
2 I use the term ‘falconer’ to describe anyone who trains birds of prey, including falcons but also hawks.  
3 These sentences are a combination of paraphrased notes and direct quotations, put together for continuity.  
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They’ll even learn to recognize me as a danger, he went on, because “they’ll learn to 
associate me with my hawk.” When I met Elijah again, I told him about being harassed by the 
group of crows at the baseball field. He said that the crows must have formed an association 
between me, himself, and his hawk, who had been harassing the roosting crows all week. Thus, 
through a web of associations that linked me to a hawk, the crows could represent me—using 
their alarm calls—as a potentially dangerous intruder. On top of that, it may have only been 
those first two crows who had seen me with a hawk the night before; by calling attention to me, 
they were teaching the rest of the crows that I may represent a danger to them all.4 I became, in 
that moment and for those crows, a hawk associate.  
This moment marked my entrance into worlds substantially different from the ones I was 
accustomed to living in. All the parts were familiar. I had seen crows before, seen hawks, even 
seen a falconer. 5 But what the crows brought me into when they collectively recognized me as a 
hawk associate—even though not all of them had necessarily seen me with a hawk—was 
something more than the sum of its parts. What emerged were fields of reality shot through with 
representations, made by different members of different species, each as agents in contesting and 
remaking the representations of the others. Let me illustrate: the crows treated the city as a winter 
roosting site for a variety of reasons only some of which we know, such as the thermal warmth 
of its concrete and for the visibility of streetlights to detect owls, their natural nocturnal 
predators. The human residents represented the roosting crows as pests, for their disruptive noise 
and the excrement they leave behind. Falconers trained hawks so as to convince the crows to 
                                                 
4 For more on crow recognition and teaching each other about danger see Marzluff et al. (2010).  
5
 An unexplored observation: doing multispecies ethnography in a familiar place, in which I spoke the human 
language of my informants, was, in fact, extremely confusing because, in order to understand the communicative 
dynamics at play, I had to learn how an entirely unfamiliar exchange of meaning took place among avian species 
and humans. 
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change the location of their roost, because they had been hired as a part of a larger apparatus of 
municipal management. I ended up there, as an ethnographer, as a student of anthropology 
looking for puzzles of multispecies relation. What I found were crows teaching each other that I 
represented a possible threat. The politics of urban order, municipal pest management, and, for 
the time being, anthropology, were entangled together with the ecological relations among avian 
species and humans. This project, then, is an attempt to describe the world that is revealed when 
birds and humans get involved in each other’s business.  
For two months in the fall of 2018, I carried out fieldwork with falconers who were hired 
to use trained birds of prey to ward off pestilent birds.6 This practice, termed falconry-based bird 
abatement, has become a widespread solution to managing the problems posed by nuisance 
birds. My fieldwork took place in central and southern California, but the falconers I met told me 
stories about abatement sites all over the country, even the world. I visited landfills where 
falconers were hired to deter thousands of seagulls from feeding on the trash and spreading it to 
the surrounding areas. I visited food courts, a bank, a museum and a downtown library, each of 
which hired falconers to chase birds off their properties. I gathered stories of falconers at 
commercial vineyards in the Pacific Northwest hired to patrol the fields seven days a week from 
dawn till dusk in order to prevent the grape output from being squandered by populations of 
starlings. I was told of composting facilities whose organized bins of sorted organic material at 
different stages of decomposition were daily upturned and scrambled by hundreds of foraging 
ravens, unless, that is, falconers could successfully keep them away. I visited entire downtown 
districts and gated suburban communities in which falconers patrolled to prevent birds from 
                                                 
6
 I returned in late December 2018 through early January 2019 to revisit some of the sites I had frequented and to 
revisit the falconers, whom I had spent time with in the fall. I also conducted several interviews over the phone as 
well as visited a falconry school located near the city of Galway in the western Connacht Province of Ireland.  
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feeding or roosting there. I heard stories about this happening in other countries, Canada, 
England, and the United Arab Emirates, to name three (Otis 2016; Colin 2016; Fuchs 2011). 
Ethnographic engagement with such practices led me to see how the contested politics of 
each of these sites were enmeshed in changing ecologies of our late-industrial age. Birds 
interpreted the changing landscape and learned to exploit the novel niches produced through the 
ecological alteration effected, intentionally or not, by human practices. Birds, then, became an 
actor, in the form of a pest, in the fraught politics through which humans carry out urban 
management, industrial farming, and waste management. My project centers around falconers 
because they are hired to intervene in the unintentional ecological effects these human practices 
set into motion. They can, I will argue, reveal how humans intentionally enter and take part in 
processes of nonlinguistic semiosis through which avian species learn to read and represent the 
changing ecologies that support them. Falconers, then, are hired to mediate the meanings of 
human practices with those of avian practices. Attention to such mediation, and the worlds of 
meaning it reveals, challenges us to rethink how representation works so that we can describe 
how it produces and contests meaning in the transspecies encounters that falconers are hired to 
arbitrate. Rethinking representation will be the theoretical challenge I face in describing these 
multispecies and multimeaning stories. Towards this end, I will narrate the circuitous route that 
led me to falconry-based bird abatement in the first place because the route partly embodies the 
challenge of rethinking the representational layers in multispecies relationships.  
The world below the birds 
 Have you ever seen a hawk soaring high above and wondered what you and the world 
around you looked like from the hawk’s aerial vantage? Every time I’m sitting next to a window 
in a plane, I press my nose against the glass, my eyes transfixed by the sight of the miniature 
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world below. I look down at the smoothed and flattened image of mountains, rivers, all the 
uneven terrain that would normally hinder my movement on the ground. I remember the first 
time I understood how to sit in my living room and read a map so as to see my whole 
neighborhood from a bird’s-eye-view. I remember, as a child, how I played with a globe in order 
to fashion myself a god, holding the world in my lap and tracing with my finger figments of 
imagination traversing the planet. I used to make myself a puppet, too, whose strings were held 
high in the sky by someone choreographing my movement. When I looked up at the concrete 
eagles perched on the columns of government buildings, I remember shrinking in wonder at their 
menacing gaze. Growing up in the American Empire, I realized from an early age that birds of 
prey, and the bird’s-eye-view they embodied, were a symbol of power.  
 My nascent observation grew into a question that eventually guided me to falconry-based 
bird abatement: how does imagining the world from a bird’s point of view lead humans to re-
imagine the world and our capacity to act in it? I wondered if there were historical and cultural 
roots to my childhood intuition that bird’s and their bird’s-eye-view were powerful. I looked into 
the history of cartography during Europe’s colonial expansion to see if there were connections 
between cartography, the bird’s-eye-view, the god’s-eye-view, and the violent carving up of the 
world into controllable territories.7 I followed these histories of the aerial view into 19th and 20th 
century aviation, space travel, environmentalism, and globalism to see if they all assumed an 
epistemological position outside of the world, looking down at it as an exterior object rather than 
living in it.8 I wondered whether Western thought used birds as part of its project to represent a 
                                                 
7
 For a critical cartography of maps, power, and imperialism, see Harley (1989). For maps in European state 
formation see Scott (1998). For colonial maps in Egypt see Mitchell (2003). For the history of the gaze from above 
see Cosgove and Cosgove (2003). 
8
 For a discussion on how the global view constructs the world as an object that is looked at, rather than lived in, see 
Ingold (2000).  
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capacity to transcend embodied positions on the earth, and the biased subjectivity that such 
positions entail, so as to imaginatively enter a disembodied, objective position from which to 
level universal knowledge claims about the world below.9   
While I pursued such questions, a small historical detail shifted the direction of the 
project, eventually leading me to the problems posed to humans by pestilent birds. I was tracing 
the bird’s-eye-view through technologies of military reconnaissance and stumbled on an 
invention—an early precursor to the contemporary Unmanned Aerial Vehicle—that brought 
birds and the humanly-imagined bird’s-eye-view into a single cyborg entity. In 1907, a German 
apothecary named Julius Neubronner strapped a camera, with a delayed timer on the shutter, to a 
carrier pigeon (DenHoed 2018). When the pigeon reached an aerial position, the shutter opened 
and blinked shut. After the pigeon returned to its coop, Neubronner developed the first 
photograph taken by a pigeon. A hybrid of animal and machine, of domesticated bird and 
objective mechanical eye, this pigeon camera seemed to embody the colonial and imperial 
pursuit for a nonhuman gaze—either of god or bird—through which the world below could be 
seen from above. Shortly after, Neubronner attempted to monetize his pigeon cameras as a 
means of reconnaissance, but the attempted militarization of the pigeon camera was quickly 
supplanted by planes—metal birds (ibid).  
Neubronner initially had the idea for such a cyborg feat after several of his carrier 
pigeons—whom he used to send prescriptions to clients—failed to return to their coop, as their 
homing instincts should ensure them to do (ibid). He wondered where they had been when they 
were not where they were supposed to be. The idea of the pigeon camera was born, therefore, 
                                                 
9
 For the epistemological power of the disembodied gaze from above see Haraway (1988), where she argues that it 
is the implicit epistemological position that unites constructivists and objectivists, the two of which seem 
diametrically opposed otherwise.  
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because a pigeon got lost. While this example fit with my overall project of locating birds and 
their aerial perspective in the nexus of the political power of modern states, it forced me to 
recognize something that I had previously ignored: the bird itself, embedded in, but not fully 
consumed by, the symbolism that human cultures projects on it. I wondered if the two parts—the 
bird and the cultural projection of the bird—were not mutually exclusive.10 After all, it was the 
fact of the pigeon doing something unexpected—what we might call ‘getting lost’—that 
provoked the cultural idea that the pigeon could have a camera strapped to its chest and take 
reconnaissance photographs of a battlefield. And it was through the intimate, power-laden 
relationship between the pigeons and the pigeon keepers that Neubronner could enlist pigeons in 
his apothecary business in the first place. My initial question transformed. I was no longer asking 
how birds are used symbolically to navigate tense relations of cultural power, but how birds 
themselves, as symbols and more-than-symbols, partake in the ecological and political spheres in 
which humans carve out their lives.  
Finding falconry-based bird abatement 
 I was captivated, not by the idea of entering the natural world in which birds live in 
balanced ecologies free from human interference; rather, I was struck by the possibility that we 
could learn something by attending to the entanglements in which birds and humans have gotten 
involved with each other’s lives. I began interviewing roboticists who were developing 
unmanned aerial vehicles based on the evolved aerial mechanics of birds in flight. This field was 
broadly termed “biomimetic robotics” and entailed using animals as a model for robotic 
                                                 
10
 For one, they are not mutually exclusive because we humans can never understand birds free from our cultural 
projections. What I realized, however, is that certain people’s cultural projections, like that of falconers and pigeon 
keepers, accentuate parts of birds that exist beyond our specifically linguistic constructions, because they activate 
the shared space of nonlinguistic semiotics that humans and birds can partake in. 
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innovation, often for military surveillance.11  To imitate the flying efficiency of birds, roboticists 
developed novel ways to measure living birds as they take off, fly and land.12 These labs were 
difficult for me to access, however, and the interviews I was granted never revealed the 
embodied relationship between roboticists and lab birds that lurked behind the words they used 
to describe their pursuits. They focused, moreover, on treating birds as mechanical feats of 
natural engineering, a focus that bracketed out the interest I had in how different birds’ points of 
view interact with different human ones. 
I also volunteered at a preserve in upstate New York, where, in the spring, we used 
telescopes to monitor the reproductive success of three pairs of peregrine falcons who were 
nesting on the cliffs. Early one morning, from behind the lens of a telescope, I followed the 
circling flight of a peregrine until it caught something in its eye and stooped, that is, dove down 
into the trees and out of my view, to try to catch its prey. The experience provoked in me an 
inarticulate wonder that, when I later read Helen Macdonald’s book H is for Hawk, resonated 
loosely with her precise reflections in training a goshawk for the first time (Macdonald 2014, 
98): 
The world she [the goshawk] lives in is not mine. Life is faster for her; time runs slower. 
Her eyes can follow the wingbeats of a bee as easily as ours follow the wingbeats of a 
bird. What is she seeing? I wonder, and my brain does backflips trying to imagine it, 
because I can’t. I have three different receptor-sensitivities in my eyes: red, green, and 
blue. Hawks, like other birds, have four. This hawk can see colors I cannot, right into the 
ultraviolet spectrum. She can see polarized light, too, watch thermals of warm air rise, 
roil, and spill into clouds, and trace, too, the magnetic lines of force that stretch across the 
earth. The light falling into her deep black pupils is registered with such frightening 
precision that she can see with fierce clarity things I can’t possibly resolve from the 
generalized blur.  
When I saw the falcon through the telescope, I asked myself what the falcon saw, but, like 
Macdonald, my question led to back flips trying to imagine something, or someone, whom I 
                                                 
11
 For a DARPA-funded military spy drone that looks like a hummingbird, see Reeve (2011).   
12 See the Lentink Lab at Stanford University for examples (Lentink Lab, n. d.).  
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couldn’t understand. At the preserve, however, the reports that we wrote at the end of each 
observation session included only the details pertinent to the falcons’ reproductive success, 
which left little room for the wonder and confusion that I had experienced and that Macdonald 
articulates. The roboticists saw birds in terms of their bodily capacity to fly and, at the preserve, 
the falcons were understood in terms of their capacity to reproduce. I asked myself: what 
contemporary practices entail backflips to the degree Macdonald describes, backflips that, while 
impossible, are nonetheless carried out? The difference between my blurred wonder at seeing a 
falcon dive and Macdonald’s astute description that stemmed from her question—what is she 
seeing? —made me realize that it matters who does the impossible backflips of imagining avian 
thoughts.  
At first, I was slow to turn my project towards falconry, even though Macdonald so 
clearly treated her goshawk as a being who thinks and represents the world differently than 
people, which was exactly the kind of human/avian relationship that interested me. I naively 
thought that falconry was a niche practice, done by very few people, who retreated from the 
entanglements of the modern world by partaking in the ancient art of training birds of prey to 
hunt with humans. Nearly all of my informants learned falconry as a hunting sport before 
enlisting their services for bird abatement. They told me, too, that the sport itself is not an ancient 
relic, nor is it considered just “a hobby.” It is a “a way of life” for many people from across the 
country who keep birds year-round and meet annually to hunt together.13 This project, though, is 
not about the history, nor the contemporary practice of falconry for hunting.  
                                                 
13
 See Schroer (2014) for an ethnography of falconry in the UK and a short history of falconry in Europe. See 
Amanda Giracca (2015) for a journalistic account of falconry in the United States. 
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When I visited a landfill in the mountainous suburbs surrounding the Los Angeles basin, 
I met a falconer and was introduced to a falcon, for the first time.14 They showed me how a 
hunting sport, in which humans and raptors learn to cooperate, had been transformed to deter 
seagulls whose predilection for feeding on the food scraps in our trash threatens the smooth 
operation that a landfill is designed to carry out. When I arrived at the landfill, an employee 
named Laura met me outside the landfill’s entrance. She drove us in her truck along the paths 
that snaked up conical mounds of newly buried trash covered by gravel and dirt. Once we crested 
a plateau, she pointed out in the distance a falconer named Luke, who stood next to his truck on a 
bluff overlooking a conical chasm below. Halfway down the chasm’s wall there was a raised hill 
that functioned as the active dump site for the daily loads of newly accumulated trash. The rest of 
the crater was being carved out by bulldozers for a future dump site. As we pulled up next to 
Luke, Laura said: “The seagulls see all the food scraps in the trash and think ‘oh, this place is a 
buffet’ and they dig it up eat it and spread it around the surrounding neighborhood. We can’t 
have that.” When I met Luke, he explained that it was his job to “convince the seagulls” that the 
landfill was not a buffet. I asked if this was a disagreement between seagulls and humans over 
what the landfill was—a buffet on the one hand, or a place to bury trash on the other. He 
laughed, but didn’t say more.15 
Infinity begins with three 
Over the course of my time working with falconers hired for bird abatement, I learned 
that birds and humans can disagree about what a landfill is, what a city is, what a farm is, and so 
forth. As with all disagreements, there is an underlying agreement of terms with which to debate. 
                                                 
14
 Although here I met a peregrine falcon, most of the trained raptors I met were hawks, specifically Harris’s Hawks 
(Parabuteo unicinctus). 
15 When I phrased this question to Luke, I may have made it sound more like a joke than a question.  
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Otherwise, it is just a misunderstanding. By acknowledging the worlds of difference between 
humans and birds, falconers working in bird abatement can sometimes find just enough common 
ground to have a disagreement. I face a difficulty in describing these underlying terms through 
which birds and humans can disagree because these terms are embedded in, but are markedly 
different from, the contested cultural contexts that anthropologists normally investigate. 16 These 
disagreements between falconers and nuisance birds become stranger still because they are only 
made possible through a third actor, a bird of prey. 
My challenge is to describe the relationality that emerges in the practice of falconry-
based bird abatement. I need to find out how the multispecies terms, with which falconers can 
cooperate with hawks so as to disagree with nuisance birds, relate to the cultural and linguistic 
contexts through which hawks are enlisted as a part of a managerial apparatus meant to alleviate 
the problems posed by nuisance birds. The symbolic anthropology famously formulated by 
Clifford Geertz (1973) will not suffice to address this challenge because, for Geertz (2000), the 
Balinese cockfights he describes so thickly are only understood in terms of human culture. He 
leaves the cocks themselves, and the nonsymbolic worlds of meaning they may engage in with 
their owners, analytically untouched.17 Geertz reads the cocks by reducing them to their very 
complex symbolic positions in the webs of Balinese culture, just as I initially reduced birds to the 
complex symbol of the bird’s-eye-view in Western culture. 
Since then, many anthropologists have endeavored to weave the worlds of nonhuman 
animals into their analyses of the political and cultural worlds of humans so as to rethink the 
                                                 
16 This is a pointed example of a difficulty that will arise again and again in this project: using linguistic terms like 
debate and disagreement so as to understand the nonlinguistic process through which humans and birds 
communicate. Chapter one will address this difficulty head on.  
17
 The impossibility for Geertz’s anthropology to reckon with meaning that is passed among species is perhaps best 
summarized by the following line: “It is only apparently cocks that are fighting. It is actually men” (Geertz 2000, 3). 
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relationship between human/animal, culture/nature, and living/nonliving (Gullo et al. 1998; 
Haraway 2003, 2008, 2016; Helmreich 2009; Kosek 2010; Candea 2010; Jerolmak 2013; Kohn 
2013; Schroer 2014; Tsing 2015, 2016; Lien 2017; Parreñas 2018). Falconry-based bird 
abatement brings together sites such as landfills, urban centers, and farms. It snakes through the 
discourse and practice of pest management together with an intimate relationship between 
falconers, raptors, and nuisance birds. I am therefore guided by the multispecies and multi-sited 
ethnographies of Helmreich (2009), Kosek (2013), Jerolmak (2013) and Tsing (2015) who show 
us respectively how microbes, honey bees, pigeons and mushrooms can be traced through the 
ecologies and politics that connect disparate sites and species across the globe. Each of these 
examples, however—along with Haraway (2008) on humans and dogs, Candea (2010) on 
scientists and Meerkats, Parreñas (2018) on humans and orangutan rehabilitation, and Schroer 
(2014) on falconers and falcons—frame their research within a dyadic relationship between two 
species, humans and a nonhuman other. Each of these authors has shown me how to begin with 
two species and to follow the threads of their tales into the tangles of other species.18 Such is 
particularly the case in Marianne Elizabeth Lien’s ethnographic work on humans and salmon at 
fish farms in Norway (Lien 2017, 121): she reveals how the relationship between the two 
“triggers the flourishing of many others and creates a cascade of new relations.” This analytical 
strategy stems from the fact that contemporary practices often relate to nonhuman animals in a 
simplified form. It is exactly our tendency to simplify into dyads of domesticator-who-controls-
                                                 
18 And they often do so in such a way as to unravel a monolithic image of human and nonhuman by revealing the 
differences among species, among groups within species, and among individuals within groups (see especially 
Parreñas 2018), even going so far as to question individualism as an atom-like unit of measure (see Haraway 2016). 
See McFall-Ngai (2017) for individualism questioned on the basis of microbes in human bodies and Gilbert (2017) 
for microbes and cows.  
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domesticated that leads to the cascading and often unintentional effects in salmon farms;19 
farmers harvest salmon in large aquacultures, sea lice feed and breed on the salmon free from 
predators, farmers bring in wrasse to feed on the sea lice, salmon feed on the wrasse. In effect, 
farmers must care for the wrasse and the arthropods and copepods that support the wrasse (ibid); 
a cascade of species, relations, and meanings.   
My question is this: how can multispecies and multi-sited ethnography maintain a 
specificity while grappling with the cascading ramifications that ecological and cultural webs 
leads us to explore ad infinitum? My mandate is this: infinity begins with three. To bring you 
into the practice of falconry-based bird abatement, I will not begin with falconers and hawks or 
with humans and nuisance birds to see how each dyadic relationship leads to a third, fourth, fifth 
and so on. To do so would be to ignore the triadic event through which the crows in Hanford 
interpellated me into the infinitely ramifying worlds of falconry-based bird abatement when they 
hailed me from above, saying, as I interpreted it, Hey, you! You are dangerous and we know it.20 
While it seemed to be a dialogic exchange between the crows and me, there was a third party 
who, while absent, was constitutive in shaping the encounter: the hawk whom the crows had 
learned to associate with me. The third party makes this practice triadic and it is only through 
these kinds of triads that falconry-based bird abatement becomes thinkable. Thus, in this project, 
I begin emphatically with three: hawk, falconer, and crow. Or, more broadly: raptors, humans, 
and nuisance birds. When my analysis snakes outward to pull into its tales municipal 
                                                 
19 The unintentional effects of the simplified relationship between domesticator and domesticated will resurface in 
chapter three, where I will draw on Anna Tsing’s logic on the hidden force within the mono-crop plantation logic of 
the Anthropocene (Tsing 2016).   
20 Again, this references Althusser’s example of a policemen hailing an individual into a subject of the state by 
saying “Hey, you there.” See Althusser (1971, 170-177). 
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management, cartography, ecological alteration, discursive categories of pestilence, etc., it does 
so from a triadic base. Never one and never two. We always begin with three.  
Chapterly threads 
Chapter one, “A line of ink that became a line of crows,” is guided by a riddle: how does 
a line of ink on a map become a line of crows in a city? The riddle is a decidedly triadic one. It 
requires us to attend to the semiotically generated meaning that is passed among crows, hawks, 
and humans. I will ask how the layered relations in the three parts of the riddle - the roosting 
crows, the chasing hawks, and the mapmaking falconers - enable the meaning of a map to be 
imported into the meaning of a crow roost.  
To probe this riddle and the transpecies signs on which it is based, I will draw on 
Eduardo Kohn as he was guided by his informants in Avila, Ecuador to pay careful attention to 
how meaning is passed, contested and remade among many beings in the Amazon forest. To 
write about the meaning produced in an ecology of selves like that of a forest, Kohn draws on 
Charles Sanders Peirce and Terrence Deacon, whose theories of semiotics provides terms with 
which to attend to how different kinds of signs impart meaning to different kinds of interpreters. 
To Kohn, many selves (not only humans ones) represent the world. I build on Kohn’s work so as 
to ask two main questions that lead us towards an understanding of the riddle that titles chapter 
one. How do crows represent the world when they roost? And how can humans say ‘no’ without 
language?  
Growing out of the more-than-human semiotic worlds described in chapter one, in 
chapter two, “A wall that that cannot be flown over,” I focus on falconers and the cultural 
context through which they use maps to aid their work in bird abatement. I will ask: how does 
one thing, a line on a map, come to represent either a path or wall? In digging into this question, 
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we will be able to see how falconers can draw a line on a map that becomes a wall that the crows 
will not cross. Doing so will help us see how meaning crosses the boundaries between human 
and avian worlds, rendering them permeable, and making bird abatement thinkable as a 
managerial strategy for pest management.  
I will then turn towards falconers’ personal relationship to birds to show how, as the title 
to chapter three indicates, the falconers I met were each an example of “A trainer who learned to 
be trained” by birds. I will place this unexpected twist on the act of training in the discursive 
context through which birds come to be understood as pests and in which falconry comes to be 
understood as a managerial solution to pest problems. I learn from falconers’ ability to be trained 
by birds, even within the channeled goals of harassment and pest management, so as to offer this 
twisted and twisting story to percolate through what Anna Tsing (2005, 1) calls the “yearnings 
and nightmares of our time.” To do so, I ask how the stories about falconers, hawks, and 
pestilent birds can help us twist the story of the Anthropocene—the proposed and hotly debated 
name for a new geological epoch in which human activity has escalated to a geological force in 
changing, or more accurately, threatening, the conditions for life on earth. I am guided here by 
the feminist interventions of Donna Haraway and Anna Tsing, and, through them, their 
companions, all who weave themselves in narratives of nets and bags, carrying and carried by 
each other in hopes of finding ways to tell tentacular tales to replace the tried and tired narratives 
of Man conquering Earth, or as Tsing (2016) writes, stories of an Earth stalked by Man.   
 I want to enter the belly of the beast, to understand how, in the heart of American Empire, 
managerial logics of control dominate the stories we can tell, including those of avian/human 
relations. This project, however, is double edged. It is positioned inside managerial logics but, 
from this position, and the partial perspective it reveals, I look for the strands of details that such 
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managerial narratives cast aside.21 It is in these details—the ones that follow thinking from avian 
to human worlds, that follow falconers as they change and are changed by birds—that we might 
find threads to lead us, perhaps tie us knottedly to, more habitable futures. In these knotted 
threads, I hope to find the possibility of changing the relations between trainer and trainee, 
between manager and managed, by twisting their logics to reveal new forms of relationality. This 
project is a beginning. An opening.     
  
                                                 
21 For more on how “partial perspectives” are epistemological positions opposed to disembodied constructivist or 
objectivist analysis, see Haraway (1998).  
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___________________________ONE___________________________ 
_____________A line of ink that became a line of crows____________ 
 
In his Manual of Psychology, Dr. Stout reminds us that ‘Human language is especially 
constructed to describe the mental states of human beings, and this means that it is 
especially constructed so as to mislead when we attempt to describe the workings of 
minds that differ in a great degree from the human.’ 
—Eliot Howard, Territory in Bird Life—31 
 
           The Riddle 
Elijah held a pair of tweezers in his right hand and plucked a slice of rat meat from a 
plastic container that sat in a shallow canvas bag strapped to his hip. With his other hand, 
covered by a leather glove, he pulled the meat from the tweezers. He raised his gloved hand, now 
clutching a tidbit of fresh rat meat between the index finger and thumb, and, with a whistle 
between his lips, blew two shrill syllables. Mars, a male Harris’s Hawk whom Elijah had been 
training for several years, turned his head upon hearing the whistle and, seeing the raised glove, 
leapt from the street light on which he had been perched. He glided towards us, descending just 
inches from the pavement before shifting his wings to catch the wind, and rose smoothly to land 
on Elijah’s glove and receive his rat reward. The three of us, Mars, Elijah and myself, continued 
to wander systematically through the streets looking for crows for Mars to chase on this rather 
warm November night in Hanford, California. 
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 Thousands of crows had been coming to downtown Hanford to roost every winter for at 
least the last decade. Claiming it as a roosting site, the crows intervened in city life. They flew to 
the city each winter evening, bringing with them their cacophonous song. When, singing again, 
they departed at dawn, the sun revealed what they had left behind: a fresh coating of speckled 
excrement adorning the sidewalks, awnings and buildings above which the crows had slept. The 
newspapers documenting the roost, described it differently (Johnson 2018): “once night falls 
people say there’s an invasion.” It is in contexts like these - where birds are interpreted by people 
as an invading presence - that falconers are hired to intervene. The falconry company that Elijah 
works for had been hired to rid Hanford of its roosting crows. As Elijah patrolled the streets with 
his hawk, he told me stories about his line of work, which has come to be called falconry-based 
bird abatement. The riddle that this chapter puts forth lies in one of the stories he told: How does 
a line of ink become a line of crows? To make sense of this riddle, I will retell the story from 
which it is drawn.   
Imagine it was early fall and you stood on the rooftop of a tall building in downtown 
Portland, Oregon. From here, if it was close to 4:00 PM, you would have seen a sky colored by 
the setting sun and dotted with clusters of crows, flying towards the city from every direction. 
For at least the last six years, thousands of crows had re-established the downtown area of 
Portland as their annual winter roosting site. Night after night, they sleep on trees, wires and 
buildings. At dawn each morning, they would depart for another day of foraging. Had you come 
to Portland during December in 2017 hoping to be astonished by the site of thousands of crows 
roosting in what otherwise looks like typical downtown shopping district; had you come 
searching for the sounds of an orchestra, because you had heard that crows, upon congregating in 
great numbers to roost, caw together in a loud display of what some might say is a form of 
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communication whose meaning we can only imagine; or had you come to see the spectacle of 
shoppers who, after the sun sets, hear clearly the corvidian orchestra yet refuse to raise their eyes 
skyward for fear of being anointed by the dropping of a crow; 1 if, upon your visit you walked to 
the corner of Broadway and Clay St. just after dusk, you would have met a stranger sight than 
you had expected.  
Looking North on Broadway and East on Clay, you hear the cawing of crows but, 
curiously, do not see a single one. Turning your head to look South on Broadway and West on 
Clay, you see thousands of roosting crows perched on nearly every building and tree in sight.2 
Why, you might ask, does the corner of these two streets seem to form the corner of an invisible 
wall that marks the sharp edge of a large roost of crows? 
I must have looked mystified, because Elijah laughed after posing the question. To help 
me understand what he meant, he stooped down next to me and swept his finger above the 
pavement. “Let’s say this is a map of Portland. When we took the job there, we drew a perimeter 
line on a map of the city to mark out the area we were to rid of roosting crows.” He drew an 
imaginary line on the pavement with his finger. “We call this the ‘project area.’ When we drew 
this line on the map, the crows roosted all over downtown.” He then pointed to the bottom left 
corner of the square grooves in the sidewalk. “Let’s say this is the intersection of Broadway and 
Clay. Months after the line had been drawn on the map, I could stand with [my hawk] Mars at 
the South-West corner of the project area, right here.” He pointed again at the grooved corner in 
pavement, “It was at this intersection that I had that experience where I could look North-West 
into the area we had been patrolling for months with our hawks and not see a single crow.” 
                                                 
1
 Corvidae is the family of which American crows are a part. I use the adjective “corvidian” in order to contrast it 
with the adjective “human;” as in human maps and corvidian caws. 
2 For an illustration of this, see the cover to this chapter.  
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Turning around, however, to face the area of downtown that had not been patrolled, Elijah was 
met with the sight of hundreds of crows roosting on the other side of the street, aligned perfectly 
with the cornered edge of the project area drawn on a map months before. The crows, he told me, 
had so precisely learned where they would and would not be harassed by a team of hawks and 
humans, that they could now watch Elijah and his hawk walking on one side of the street and 
remain unfazed, knowing as they did, that they could sleep safely on the other side of the street. 
Perhaps, jaw agape, I still looked confused, because Elijah continued to explain. The line 
on the map, he told me, marked the edge of where we patrolled with our hawks and walking this 
line over and over again helped us build a kind of “mutual understanding” with the crows that 
told them where they could roost in peace. “They learned,” he said, “that if they roost on this 
side of the street they’ll get harassed and if they roost on that side, they’ll get a good night 
sleep.” 
A line of ink, therefore, can become a line of crows because of a strange triadic relation: 
the line was drawn on a map, that line was walked by patrolling pairs of falconers and hawks, 
and the roosting crows could learn those patrol patterns to a T.  
This chapter grows out of my attempts to reckon with the layered pieces embedded in the 
riddle Elijah posed to me. It makes me ask: how can I describe the relationship between lines on 
maps, patrol routes of hawk/human pairs, and learned crows roosting in a city? The riddle pulls 
me into the same worlds that the Hanford crows interpellated me into when they cawed that I 
was dangerous (see introduction). To write about the stories in which lines on maps can become 
lines of patrol routes, that, in turn, can become lines of crows, I will enlist the help of several 
guides. First and foremost, I am guided by the falconers who have taught me how humans can 
exchange meaning with birds without using the linguistic signs of human language. I am also 
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guided by the crows, who have learned to treat me as a hawk associate (see introduction). To 
parse through the kinds of signs that impart meaning without the help of language, I will bring 
into our story an account of semiosis - the process of making and exchanging signs - as 
formulated by Eduardo Kohn in his ethnographic work in Ecuador (Kohn 2013). Kohn’s 
semiotics will provide the terms with which I argue that crow roosts are representations of the 
city made and used by crows, just as maps are representations of the city made and used by 
humans. Doing so will provide a symmetry of terms so that I can show how falconry-based bird 
abatement moves lines from one form of representation, a map, to another, a crow roost.  
This chapter will dwell firmly in crow roosts so as to establish semiosis as a more-than-
human phenomenon. For a moment, then, I will foreground the representations made by crows 
and put in the background the explicitly cultural and political contexts in which falconry-based 
bird abatement emerges. Doing so will decenter the contested relations among people so as to 
better understand them as positioned in the broader semiotic fields, in which many species are 
entangled in patches of livability, made and remade through contested processes of 
representation. In chapter two, I will situate city maps used in bird abatement in this broader 
semiotic field so as to see how, as in our riddle, they can modify the representations of crows. In 
part of chapter three, I will trace the nonlinguistic signs described in this chapter into the 
discursive structures through which humans interpret crow roosts as pests. In this chapter, I will 
parse through the semiotic reasoning by which crows choose their roosting location. Doing so 
will help us understand how falconers intervene in this reasoning so that the crows learn to roost 
differently. The riddle will guide these chapters because it illustrates how, more broadly, 
representations of many species come to affect and change one another.  
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Reactions and Representations  
I will begin with two apparently contrasting ways that falconers describe the crows’ 
ability to precisely learn the falconers’ patrol routes. When Elijah told me why the crows could 
learn to roost just outside the project area, he described it as a “mutual understanding” built 
between the falconers and crows. He qualified his statement, however, by saying that he wasn’t 
sure exactly what the crows understood. “At the very least,” he said, “the crows understood that 
when they roost in the project area it’s a nightmare for them and when they roost outside it, they 
get a good night’s sleep.” On many occasions he emphasized how intelligent crows were, but he 
stressed, as did several other falconers, that there was a mystery about birds - crows, hawks, etc. 
- that he would never fully understand. “They’re all strange.”  
When he told me the Portland story again in January ‘19, Elijah made a curious 
connection between the strangeness of the crows and the established language of animal training. 
The process through which falconers tell the crows where and where not to roost was the same 
process that Elijah employs to train hawks to fly to his glove: conditioning through positive 
reinforcement. To train his hawk Mars to fly to his glove, Elijah had to slowly teach Mars to 
associate his glove with food, which helped Mars unlearn his natural distrust for eating near 
humans. Once this association was made, Elijah could teach Mars other behaviors, with food 
rewards as positive reinforcement. To scare crows in Hanford, for instance, Elijah shined a laser 
pointer so that a red dot rested on the curved crest of a street light. Seeing this, Mars reacted by 
flying to the dot and perching on the street light. After the crows got a good frightened look at 
Mars, reacted with loud alarm for all the crows around to hear, and flew away, Elijah raised his 
glove holding a slice of meat. Mars leapt into descent and, landing on the glove, devoured his 
reward for flying to the laser.  The laser, the glove, the raised arm, all of these became associated 
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with food in a semiotic web that Elijah used to build a relationship—what Schroer (2014) calls a 
‘bond’—with  his hawk Mars.3 Similarly, Elijah suggested to me, the crows are rewarded with a 
good night’s sleep whenever they roosted to the South-West of Broadway and Clay, and, after 
this reward was repeated in a precise and consistent way, would only roost in that area. It seems, 
then, that repeated harassment in a precisely defined area over the course of two months enables 
a line of ink drawn by humans on a map to come to be reflected by a line of crows perched at the 
edge of a new roosting location.  
Unlike the tentative and inconclusive tone with which Elijah spoke of “mutual 
understanding” and “strangeness,” the vocabulary of positive and negative reinforcement of 
classical conditioning has the discursive assurance of an entrenched history in animal training 
and ethology, the study of animal behavior.4 Its presumption, however, often begins by reducing 
mental activity to conditioned reactions to stimuli. While classical conditioning might be helpful 
for articulating how to train animals, we should be careful in limiting our capacity to understand 
crows to a mechanized image of animal reactions to positive and negative stimuli. To do so 
precludes our capacity to understand how birds can learn to represent the world based on their 
experience in it. And this, in turn, would prevent us from solving our riddle, because it is into 
these corvidian representations that falconers intervene in bird abatement.  
The map of Portland—used to draw the perimeter of the project area—was clearly a 
representation of the city made by humans. Are roosts representations of the world made by 
crows?  If we want to take the riddle’s metamorphosis seriously - that a line on a map really did 
                                                 
3 For an extended ethnographic account of how falconers create a bond with their birds, see Schroer (2014, chapter 
three).   
4
 See, for instance, Skinner (1957) for how positive/negative reinforcement relates to language. See Noam 
Chomsky’s critique of Skinner (Chomsky 1967). For more on classical conditioning used in dog training see 
Haraway (2003).   
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become a line of crows - then we have to ask how humans represent the world in maps and how 
crows represent the world in their roosting formations. When we treat maps and roosts both as 
representations of the world from the human and crow point of view respectively, we open 
ourselves up to understanding how one kind of representation can become another. In doing this 
with humans and crows we become immediately aware of the distance between a map and roost, 
because the world as understood by a mapmaking humans and that of roostmaking crows seems 
so drastically different.  
I want to linger in the “strange” and tentative “mutual understandings” that Elijah 
suggested because it is in these terms that he both made the leap towards imagining the crow’s 
point of view while opening up the mysteries that such corvidian representations entail. To take 
the risk of projecting a human mind into a crow body so as to imagine how a crow roost might 
represent a city, I am guided by Elijah, and the other falconers I met. Elijah told me that he and 
others suspect that crows share information about foraging sites when they caw together in loud 
groups. But he still doesn’t know exactly how a particular “caw” represents a fruitful foraging 
location. In order to succeed in their work, my informants seemed to operate under the 
assumption of mutual unintelligibility between how crows and humans represent the world. 
Humans are unable to precisely interpret crows’ caws just as crows are unable to read humans’ 
maps. To exchange meaning, then, in this dyadic relationship between humans and crows, 
falconers must operate using a mode of representation that is not a human map nor a corvidian 
caw. Falconry-based bird abatement, therefore, must involve intermediary forms of meaning that 
can translate the meaning of a map into a form that the crows have the capacity to interpret and, 
based on their interpretation, alter the location of their roost. This brings us back to our triadic 
27 
 
 
base—hawk, falconers, and crows. This chapter is about the relationship between crows and 
these intermediary forms of meaning. 
A Recorded Predator (bluffing) 
Falconers start from a definitive baseline of mutual unintelligibility between crows and 
themselves so that, through their work, they can move towards a strange, tentative, and mutual 
understanding. To grasp the difficulty of this task, consider what the falconers could obviously 
not do: put a sign out that reads in big bold type NO ROOSTING BEYOND THIS POINT. To 
do so would not only be absurd; it would also be to ignore the fundamental challenge with which 
any method of bird abatement has to reckon: how to say ‘no’ without using human language.5 
Eduardo Kohn (2013) will help us describe the ways that falconers address this challenge, but 
before we turn to him, let us first ask if Elijah could have translated the message ‘No roosting 
here’ into a series of caws that the crows could understand. This brings us to one key method of 
bird-abatement that the falconers I worked with always brought up to illustrate the intelligence of 
nuisance birds and the difficulties faced by humans doing bird-abatement. At first it seems easy 
to translate the message “no roosting” into bird language: set up a loudspeaker that amplifies a 
recorded distress call of the pest species or the call of that species’ predator. As every falconer 
made clear to me, however, this might initially deter the birds, but after a few days the target 
birds will realize that the recorded sound—which closely resembles one of their conspecifics in 
distress or their predator’s call—is not actually either.6 “They learn that the recorded sound is, in 
fact, harmless,” a falconer named Leah told me. “They’re smart that way. They can call a bluff.”  
                                                 
5
 This sentence is a slight rephrasing of Kohn (2013, 147) when he writes about an “important challenge: how to say 
‘Don’t’ without language.” I will expand on Kohn’s argument in the pages that follow.  
6
 Conspecifics refer to members of one’s own species.  
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I witnessed something similar when I walked to the Hanford train station with Elijah and 
his hawk Mars. As we approached, we heard the high-pitched screeching of a falcon playing 
from a speaker under the eaves of the station. Hundreds of crows, however, were roosting on the 
roof just above, the recorded predator call clearly having no success in deterring them. The 
ability for crows to, as Leah put it, “call a bluff” can show us how crows interpret the world and, 
in so doing, help us to answer our earlier question of how a crow roost is a representation. How 
does a crow call the bluff? This question gets to the heart of the semiotic worlds revealed by 
falconry-based bird abatement.7 
Describing how crows can call a bluff through Eduardo Kohn’s framework of semiotics 
will reveal the threads with which to unravel two earlier puzzles: (1) how an urban crow roost is 
a representation of a city, and (2) how to say “no” without language. Understanding these two 
puzzles will, in turn, allow us to articulate how, through a contested and ongoing process of 
semiosis, falconry can transform a line of ink into a line of crows.   
In his book How Forests Think, Kohn (2013) argues that we must change how we 
understand human thoughts—entangled as they are in human contexts and histories—so as to see 
how, in the Amazon forests of Ecuador, it is not only humans who think; rather, thoughts 
pervade the entire forest, enabling his human informants in the town of Avilla to think along 
with the jaguars, dogs, ants, peccaries and many others. To write about these sylvan thoughts—
which include but are not circumscribed by human subjects—within anthropology, Kohn must 
move the discipline “beyond the human” (ibid). I faced the same problem in doing field work 
with falconers working in bird-abatement. If I were to only focus on human modes of thinking 
                                                 
7
 A short cut would be to describe this is terms of what biologists—as well as a few of the falconers—call 
“habituation,” in which animals dissociate a repeated stimulus from its normal response (Frost et al. 2009). I will, 
however, continue to wade through the muddle of representations because it can help us follow meaning from a map 
into a crow roost.   
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and the human contexts that shape them, I would have to ignore the ways that falconers must 
reckon with how birds think differently. To move anthropology in this direction, Kohn argues 
that first, “we need provincialize language because we conflate language with representation.”8 
In the case of bird-abatement, the problems with this conflation are amplified. If falconers 
thought of representation—the process whereby signs re-present something of the world—as 
only operating linguistically, then they would put out a sign reading “NO ROOSTING” and 
expect to teach the crows how human language represents the world. They don’t do this precisely 
because they are familiar with signs that both humans and birds can interpret and they know 
these signs operate differently than human language.  
Recorded predator calls, like the one I heard in Hanford—even if they only deter birds 
temporarily—provide a good example for how representation exists both beyond language and 
beyond the human.  Rather than conflate language with representation, Kohn suggests that we 
can understand both more clearly by treating language as a special kind of representation that 
emerges out of other kinds of representation (Kohn 2013, 49-57.). To do this, Kohn builds on a 
theory of semiotics formulated by American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce and follows 
biological anthropologist Terrence Deacon in his interpretation of Pierce. I will work through the 
terms of semiosis that Kohn draws from Peirce and Deacon using the example of how crows 
interpret a recorded predator call that sounds like a hawk. Guided by these terms, we will then 
address our riddle. In this theory of semiotics, interpretations are built through the relations 
among three types of signs: icons, indices, and symbols (Kohn 2013; Deacon 1997; Peirce 1894). 
Each of these types of signs names a particular kind of relationship between a sign-vehicle, such 
as the letters in the word “hawk”, and its object, such as an actual hawk. In the example of how 
                                                 
8
 Kohn draws the phrase “provincializing language” from Dipesh Chakrabarty’s Provincializing Europe (2000).  
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recorded hawk calls are signs interpreted by crows, the sound of the call would be the vehicle 
that connects to a living hawk as its object.  
Unlike Ferdinand de Saussure’s dyadic relation between signifier and signified, Peirce’s 
semiotics is decidedly triadic. 9 The connection between vehicle and object—between the 
recorded call and the hawk—only becomes meaningful because the connection is interpreted by 
someone, such a crow. As Peirce put it, a sign is “something which stands to somebody for 
something in some respect or capacity” (quoted in Kohn 2013, 29).  This someone is not 
necessarily human. Through the example of how recorded hawk calls “stands to” crows for a 
hawk, we will be able to understand how iconic and indexical signs operate in a world that 
includes but is not circumscribed by human cultural meaning. Doing so will open us up to the 
world comprised of what Kohn calls “living thoughts,” that is, chains of signs that are 
interpreted, represented, and passed along by many different kinds of life. By taking “thoughts” 
out of the body and the mind, we can follow “thinking” as it moves through the world. In 
learning how to follow thoughts through the world, we will eventually return to our riddle and 
ask how a line on a map is a kind of thought that moved through the world to become another 
kind of thought in the form of a line of crows.  
Noticing and Pointing 
How does the connection between a hawk call and a hawk become meaningful to a crow? 
To answer this question, we have to make a leap by imagining what a hawk call sounds like to a 
crow. In doing so, we risk projecting a human mind—with its capacity for human language—
into a crow body. We risk, in other words, conflating representation with human language (Kohn 
2013). The trichotomy of icon, index, symbol is helpful here because it confines—or as Kohn 
                                                 
9
 See Saussure (1959). For Kohn’s discussion of Saussure see (Kohn 2013, 29, 39).  
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puts it “provincializes”—language to a particular kind of sign, called a symbol. Most of human 
language is a symbol, as are each of the words on this page.10 According to Kohn (2013) and 
Deacon (1997, 2012) symbols can only be interpreted by human beings, but icons and indices are 
used by all biological life, including humans.11 If we are to take the risk of imagining what a 
hawk call sounds like to a crow, the semiotic terms of icon and index can be helpful guides 
because, unlike symbols, both humans and crows interpret them. By working through icons and 
indices, we will be able to see how a crow roost is a representation and how to say ‘no’ without 
language.  
As many falconers told me, when crows first encounter a recorded hawk call, such as the 
one playing from a speaker at the Hanford train station, they will react as if they encountered a 
living hawk. In effect, they will avoid the area in which the hawk call is being played. Similarly, 
when I first heard the recorded hawk call recording at the Hanford train station, I thought it was a 
real bird call until Elijah told me otherwise. At one level, the crows’ and my initial interpretation 
of the recorded hawk call is what Peirce described as iconic. An icon is a sign whose vehicle 
resembles or is analogous to its object. In our case, a recorded a hawk call resembles or has a 
“likeness” to the call of a living hawk. The recorded hawk call is iconic with a living hawk call 
insofar as it is interpreted by the crow to be the call of a living hawk. This leads to a confusing 
attribute with which iconic signs operate. Icons are about not noticing difference (Deacon 1997, 
76; Kohn 2013, 51). The crows were deterred by the recorded hawk call because they did not 
notice that the sound of a hawk was not being vocalized by an actual hawk. The crows confused 
the recorded hawk call for the actual hawk call that it sounds like. “For this reason,” writes 
                                                 
10
According to Kohn, there are a few words that do not operate symbolically. For a discussion of one of these words 
in Quichua, see Kohn (2013, 27-33).  
11
 For a discussion on how the boundary between biological life and nonliving matter was invented and continued to 
be constructed, see Helmreich (2009) and Agamben (2004). 
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Kohn, “iconicity occupies a space at the very margins of semiosis (for there is nothing semiotic 
about never noticing anything at all)” (Kohn 2013, 51). Icons, then, are signs that can almost 
disappear by virtue of the fact they are mistaken for the thing they represent. 
If iconic signs work by collapsing the distinction between sign-vehicle and object, how 
do indexical signs work? Consider the fact that, when the crows reacted to the hawk call with 
fear, they never saw a flying hawk—they only heard its call. Part of their reaction of fear lies in 
the relationship between the sound of the hawk and the hawk itself. A hawk call, even issued by 
the throat of a hawk rather than an electronic speaker, is not exactly the thing that crows fear 
because it not a mere call that will swoop down and kill them. Rather, when crows hear a hawk 
call but do not see a hawk, they become afraid because the call indicates to them that there is a 
hawk—which can kill them—nearby. Indexical signs relate to their objects through contiguity in 
that there is a physical connection between the hawk call and the hawk. Kohn writes that “while 
icons involve not noticing, indices focus the attention” (ibid 32). While icons disappear in their 
resemblance to their objects, indices point towards something else that is not immediately visible 
or present. Hearing a hawk call points towards a hawk, even if the hawk cannot be seen.  
While icons and indices are used to describe relationships between sign-vehicles and 
objects, how do iconic signs relate to indexical signs? As Kohn, Deacon, and Peirce describe 
them, indexical signs are made possible by building on the relations among iconic signs. This 
can help us understand how, in the first place, crows interpret a hawk call as an index of a 
potentially dangerous hawk. When crows react to a hawk call, they do so because they recognize 
that the sound of the call resembles other calls that they have heard before. The relationship 
between the call they are hearing now and the similar calls they’ve heard before is iconic. It is 
iconic in the sense that the crows, to some degree, do not notice the difference between this 
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current call and the past calls. Now, imagine that these past calls were also similar to each other 
in that, when crows heard these past calls, they were in close proximity to a hawk, either because 
the sound emanated just as a hawk opened its bill or because a hawk followed just after the call 
was heard. By noticing the similarity—or, put another way, not noticing the difference—the 
crows make the connection that this call, being similar to other calls they’ve heard, might also 
beget the presence of a hawk, just as past calls had done. It is in the phrase “might also” that an 
indexical sign emerges as a new kind of meaning from the relations among iconic signs. When a 
crow reacts to a hawk call with fear, it is because this call might also bring with it a hungry 
hawk. Thinking indexically, then, allows crows to react in the present based on their predictions 
for the future. In general, indices point towards something else and, in doing so, they bring a 
“possible future” to bear on the present (Kohn 2013, 52).  Indices are a distinct type of sign in 
that they allow their interpreters to act in the present based on predictions for the future.  
“All living selves,” writes Kohn, “do things for the sake of the future by representing it in 
the present” (Kohn 2013, 41). What I was before calling “reactions” in the present based on 
conjecture about the future, Kohn calls “representations” (ibid). Reactions can happen in a 
chemical process or due to the physical properties of dead matter (“reaction” n. 2019).12 To 
represent, in contrast, is to interpret what’s been presented to you and re-present it back into the 
world. As Kohn reminds us, “all living selves” represent. Without getting into the boundaries 
between living selves who represent and dead matter which reacts, we can safely say that crows, 
hawks, and humans are not lifeless matter. This linguistic shift, therefore, can lead us to 
understand how a crow roost is a re-presentation of crows’ experience in the world, rather than a 
mere reaction to it.  
                                                 
12 See definition 1.a and 2.a for “reaction” in the Oxford English Dictionary.  
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Saying ‘no’ without language 
Kohn (2013, 147) puts the challenge of “how to say ‘don’t’ without language” in the 
following way: “How do you tell a dog not to bite when the only secure modes of 
communication available are via likeness and contiguity? How do you negate a resemblance or a 
relation of contiguity without stepping outside the strictly iconic and indexical forms of 
reference?” 
Before asking how humans might say ‘no’ to nonhuman animals, we can ask more 
generally, how, in the semiotic webs in which living selves are spun, do the likeness of icons and 
the contiguity of indices fall apart? In this vein we can return to how crows habituate themselves 
to the sound recordings of hawk calls by calling a bluff. Recorded hawk calls deter crows 
because they sound like the calls that crows have heard before. These past calls indexically relate 
to a dangerous hawk. Because of an index, they learn to avoid the areas in which they hear this 
kind of call because they suppose that a hawk is there. However, in the case of a recording, they 
hear this call repeatedly in the same place but they never see the hawk to which the call is 
supposed to connect indexically. Over time, therefore, they become habituated. That is, because 
the call’s indexical object (the hawk) never appears, the contiguity between this particular call 
and a hawk is called into question. Deacon (1997, 74) calls something similar a “breakdown of 
referential competence.” With the breakdown of the indexical contiguity between hawk call and 
hawk, the iconicity between this call and prior hawk calls is also destabilized (ibid). Thus, the 
entire semiotic chain—built from icons into indices—that results in crows being afraid of 
recorded hawk calls falls apart. It falls apart because the indexical object, in this case a 
dangerous hawk, fails to materialize. The consistent lack of the indexical object then results in a 
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break in the iconic associations between this call and past hawk calls. Semiotic chains, therefore, 
are fragile and it is in their fragility that we can find how ‘no’ operates in iconic and indexical 
reasoning. Falconers sometimes narrated the thoughts of birds. Inspired by them, I try to do the 
same here. I imagine that the crows thought: “No, this hawk call does not lead to a dangerous 
hawk. No, this hawk call is not the same as other hawk calls we’ve heard before. Unlike the 
others, this one does not indicate the presence of a hawk. We no longer have to heed it as an 
indication of danger.”  
This is a semiotic understanding, then, of what biologists call habituation, the process 
whereby animals come to ignore a stimulus that they would otherwise react to. The ability to 
ignore the hawk call is, on one level, a breakdown of the iconic and indexical chain that led to 
crows being afraid. But, importantly, in ignoring the hawk call, a new iconic relationship 
emerges. When they ignore the hawk call, the living thought that they hawk call puts into the 
world, is ended. The call becomes just another ignored sound in the plethora of sounds that are 
not important to crows. Icons are about not noticing. As Kohn writes, “icons mark the beginning 
and end of thought” (Kohn 2013, 51). The recorded sound of a hawk call fades into the 
background to become iconic with noise.13 
Now that we’ve seen how crows use the logic of “no” sans language to ignore the 
recorded hawk calls, let us move to how falconers say “no roosting here” to birds using iconic 
and indexical signs. To understand the challenge of doing so, we can compare saying “no” 
without language to saying “no” with language. The ability to negate indexical connections, as 
the crows did with the recorded hawk call, is made possible because of how stability and 
instability work in indexical signs. Indices are based on contiguity or contact between the sign-
                                                 
13 For a discussion on how iconic associations lead to undifferentiated noise, or ‘stuff,’ see Deacon (1997, 65-75).  
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vehicle and the object. Therefore, if the sign-vehicle is consistently disconnected from its object, 
then the indexical relation between the two falls apart. Human language, in contrast, operates 
differently and it is this difference that led Pierce, Deacon, and Kohn to use a third name to 
describe it: symbols.  
As Kohn describes them, there is a hierarchical relationship among icons, indices, and 
symbols. As we saw with the hawk call and the crows, it is out of the relations among icons that 
indices emerge. They emerge as something new, different from icons, because indices point 
towards something else, whereas icons collapse the difference between things. Indexical signs, 
therefore, need icons to convey meaning but icons do not need indices. There is a similar 
relationship between indices and symbols. “Symbols,” writes Kohn, “are built from a complex 
layered interaction among indices, but indices do not require symbols” (ibid: 53). Language is 
symbolic in the sense that words refer to their objects “indirectly, by virtue of [their] relation to 
other words” (ibid). There are two indexical associations to be made to understand how a word 
connects to its object: first one has to understand how a word is an index of its place within a 
system of related words. Then, using this relationship—between word and language—as another 
index, one can make the indexical connection between a word and its object. Through the 
layering of indexical connections, words can connect to their objects “arbitrarily” in that there is 
no contact or contiguity between the form of the word and its object, as there is with indices 
(ibid). Because words, being symbolic, are not tied to or contiguous with the objects to which 
they refer, they gain a stability that indexical signs do not have. As Kohn writes, “the fact that 
symbols achieve their referential power by virtue of the systemic relations they have to each 
other means that, as opposed to indices, they can retain referential stability even in the absence of 
their objects” (ibid:55). The referential stability of symbols is exactly what indices lack. In the 
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“absence of their object,” indexical signs, like the recorded hawk calls, can lose their meaning. If 
crows hear the same hawk call in the same place but never see a hawk, they can break the 
indexical connection between call and hawk because the vehicle proved to be discontiguous with 
its purported object. The referential stability of the symbolic, however, brings with it its own 
type of instability. By not being tied to their objects, symbols can beget so many possible futures 
that anxiety can overtake the human interpreter (see Kohn 2013, 48). Thus, both indices and 
symbols have a stability that the other lacks. From each kind of stability, in turn, a different kind 
of instability, a capacity for referential breakdown, emerges.14 
Understanding how symbolic reference works, we can see how easy it is to say “no” with 
language. Words like “no,” which are the negation of words like “yes,” embody how symbols are 
not tied to their objects. Saying “no” symbolically seems so simple because the word “no” 
becomes meaningful, not in direct relation to its object, but in oppositional relation to the word 
“yes.” Words like “no” have no concrete object. Rather, they negate whatever other semiotic 
connections are being made. The difficulty with saying “no” without language, then, may lie in 
the fact the idea of “no” is symbolically constructed to negate other symbolic constructions. To 
negate semiotic connections between icons and indices in falconry-based bird abatement is to set 
aside the symbolic and instead harness the potential for semiotic chains of icons and indices to 
break down, just as we saw the crows doing with the recorded hawk call. 
Roostability 
How did falconry-based bird abatement enable humans to enter a position from which 
they could destabilize the indexical reasoning by which crows choose their roosting locations? 
                                                 
14
 My goal here is not to fully delve into Kohn’s discussion for how symbolic reference becomes destabilized in the 
form of anxiety, but to show how iconic and indexical reference have a particular instability, based on how they 
connect signs to objects, and it is this particular instability that falconers can tap into so as to say ‘no’ without 
language.  
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Elijah answered this question earlier, using different terms, when he said that the crows roost 
outside of the project area because they learned to do so through the negative reinforcement of 
hawk harassment and the positive reinforcement of a hawkless night’s sleep. Equipped with icon 
and index, I will frame Elijah’s explanation in terms of representation so that I can better relate 
the crow roost to the map from our riddle.  
The crow roost in Portland was a representation of where the crows predicted, based on 
indexical reasoning, they would get the best night’s sleep. If they roosted “all over the city,” as 
Elijah said they did before the abatement project started, it was because the crows reasoned that 
they could roost anywhere and still get a good night’s sleep. In other words, they represented the 
entire city of Portland as roostable. Each night, this prediction was made using indexical 
reasoning by iconically connecting their past experiences of waking up well rested after sleeping 
in particular areas to their present decision of where to sleep. Treating different locations as an 
index of a possible future, they can then determine where they should sleep to increase their 
prospects of waking up well rested.  
By systematically wandering through the project area and using hawks to chase any 
crows they saw, the team of falconers harnessed the fragility of the crows’ indexical reasoning. 
“Everywhere in the city” no longer yielded the crows a good night’s sleep, only some places did.  
Through repeated harassment, the falconers broke the indexical connection that crows had made 
between the parts of the city in the project area and the prospects of a good night sleep. 
Eventually, the crows could predict where they would and would not be harassed, which led 
them to collectively alter the location of their roost to conform to the edges of the project area. 
Put another way, the crows learned to represent the city differently.  
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The ability to say “no” without language lies in the fragility of indexical reasoning and 
the ability to break and remake indexical connections. Combining Elijah’s explanation and 
Kohn’s ideas of representation, we can say that a crow roost is a representation of a place, like 
the city of Portland, built from the collective predictions of crows about where they will get a 
good night’s sleep. We can understand how a crow roost represents a place by thinking of it in 
terms of what I would call roostability.15 When crows choose a roosting location, they are 
representing the chosen area as roostable, and the area outside of it as less roostable. Humans, in 
the same area, might represent the city as walk-able, drive-able, live-able, shop-able, etc. But 
these human representations of the city are not the kind of representations that falconers must 
alter to succeed in bird abatement. What this means, then, is that falconry-based bird abatement 
must operate in terms of roostability so as to alter how the crows, rather than the humans, 
represent the city.  
It is important to be able to imagine what a crow roost, as a representation, looks like 
because, in order to answer our riddle, we have to show how different forms of representation 
affect each other. How can we use language to envision a representation that is built, not from 
symbolic signs, but from indexical ones? One way to do so is to use an analogy. Jakob Von 
Uexkull provides a helpful analogy to envision how animals gravitate towards what biologists 
call “the familiar path” (von Uexkull 1934).  We can use this same analogy to help us grasp how 
a crow roost might feel to a crow. The familiar path names a problem that biologists were trying 
to solve in the early 20th century. Biologists studying animal behavior observed that animals 
tended to travel along the familiar path, even when an unfamiliar path afforded them a shorter 
route to their destination. Von Uexkull (von Uexkull 1934,102) states his final conclusion: “All 
                                                 
15
 I use roostability to allude to other terms like livability, which frames an analysis of something based on the 
capacity for living, or roosting, to take place. 
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in all,” he writes, “one could say that the familiar path works like a streak of a more fluid 
medium in a more viscous one.”16 
When animals follow the familiar path, they represent the world in terms of familiarity 
and unfamiliarity. In von Uexkull’s analogy, the world begins as viscous. Through experience, 
the familiar becomes fluid and the unfamiliar remains viscous. We could say, then, that the crow 
roost represents the world in a similar way. The roostable parts of the city become patches of 
fluid medium amidst a more viscous and less-roostable one. By walking through the project area 
with hawks, falconers interject new information in the fluid-to-viscous distribution of space. The 
patrolled project area, therefore, becomes viscous to the roosting crows allowing only areas 
outside its perimeter to remain fluid. Using this fluid-viscous analogy, we are able to imagine 
something of the way crows represent the cities in which they roost.  
At the same time, we should be aware of the limits of such analogical reasoning. They 
can sometimes deceive.17 Is our analogy from von Uexkull also misleading us?  
The analogy of fluid to viscous deceives us in the same way that it helps us. It gives us 
two extremes to use in imagining how a crow roost represents a city, but it also renders their 
representation in black and white. In other words, in order to grasp how crow roosts represent the 
world, we have simplified the process in terms of the dichotomy between roostable and 
unroostable, between fluid and viscous. Nonetheless, the line between fluid and viscous can help 
us understand our riddle of how a crow roost came to conform to the line drawn on a map. The 
analogy, which emphasizes the stark contrast between fluid and viscous, helps us picture how 
                                                 
16
 I am not discussing von Uexkull’s famous concept of the Umwelt. For more, see von Uexkull (1934). For a 
critique, see Kohn (2013, 84).  
17 There is a long history in biology of using and fearing analogies. As Charles Darwin wrote in The Origin of the 
Species, “analogies can be a deceitful guide” (see Norton 2001, 171). Even though the basis of his argument for 
natural selection is its analogous relationship to artificial or human selection, he reminds us that analogies can 
deceive.  
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falconry so precisely altered the crows’ roosting location to conform to the line on the map that 
marked the edge of the project area.  
Elijah described the crows reasoning as governed by getting a goodnight’s sleep. He 
guided me to consider a crow roost as a collective representation of where crows predict they 
will wake up well rested. However, I need to conjure an image of this corvidian representation so 
that, in the next chapter, I can contrast it with the image of a map. Picturing each as different 
kinds of representation will put us in the position to follow thinking as it moves from a crow 
roost, to a map, and from a map to a falconry patrol route, and from a patrol route to an altered 
crow roost. By following thinking in this way, I hope to reveal that representation and materiality 
are mutually constituted and continuously changed by the contested representations made by life 
on earth.  
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Pests and Lines 
Elijah, one of the falconers who took me around his job site in Hanford, CA, told me a 
story about pestilent crows in Portland. This story posed the riddle to which the previous chapter 
was dedicated: how did a line of ink on a map become a line of crows in a city? Elijah was a part 
of a team of falconers hired to rid the downtown area of Portland of thousands of crows who 
came to roost there each night.1 When they took the job, they drew a line on a map of Portland to 
demarcate the perimeter of what they called the “project area,” the defined space which they 
were hired to keep roosting crows out of. A few months later, Elijah stood on the street that 
marked the edge of the project area and encountered the riddle: when he looked into the project 
area, which he and other falconers had been patrolling with hawks for the last two months, he did 
not see a single crow. Turning around, however, he saw hundreds of crows roosting on the other 
side of the street, marking the edge of the area that the falconers had not patrolled. This street 
seemed to form an invisible wall between where crows would and would not roost, based on 
where they had and had not been consistently harassed by a team of humans and hawks. The 
                                                 
1
 As a reminder, a crow roost is an area in which crows sleep during the winter. While, during the breeding season 
they break up into smaller groups, the winter roosts are communal and can include, in some cases, 10,000 crows.  
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crows, then, had learned to roost precisely on one side of the line that had been drawn on a map 
months earlier.  
This riddle asks us to tell the story of how the crows in Portland learned to roost 
differently and how this difference was based on their interpretation of the practice of falconry-
based bird abatement. In chapter one I suggested that we can face the challenge of telling this 
story by thinking of the two parts of the riddle—mapped lines on the one hand and crow roosts 
on the other—as representations. Doing so allows us to ask how one kind of representation, a 
line on a map, comes to affect another, very different kind of representation, a crow roost. This 
was possible, I argue, because falconry-based bird abatement, a practice in which humans learn 
to exchange meaning with birds, acted as a series of intermediary representations between human 
maps and crow roosts so that the meaning expressed by a map could become the meaning 
expressed by a roost. Thinking of this riddle in terms of representation demands that we rethink 
who has the capacity to represent. Doing so provides a symmetry, in terms of representation, 
among mapmaking humans, hunting hawks, and roosting crows. While chapter one focused on 
how crow roosts express meaning—or, put differently how crows represent the city when they 
roost—this chapter will focus on maps and the humans who use them in bird-abatement projects.  
 The project area, by which the falconers and those who hire them can demarcate the area 
from which they are to rid a population of nuisance birds, is defined by marking its perimeter 
with a line drawn on a typical navigational map. This line does not reflect or describe something 
that exists. Rather, it represents a proposition, perhaps a prediction that, should the abatement 
project succeed, this area will be free of nuisance birds. Building on chapter one, to represent is 
not to reflect a reality but to “do things in the present for the sake of the future” (Kohn 2013, 41). 
In this sense, both representation in general and project areas in particular can be transformed 
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from nouns into verbs so as to reveal how they are fashioned not to be something, but to do 
something. To understand how maps are made to represent a project area is to understand how 
maps can project—as a verb with directional force—a precise spatialization of an altered crow 
roost from the present into the future. This chapter, therefore, will look at how falconers use 
maps to project a field of operations that allow them to act upon and intervene in space as well as 
time so as to alter how crows choose their roosting location. On a map, a project area conjures a 
future. 
The project area is not drawn on a blank piece of paper. In the case of two large scale 
abatement projects—one in Portland, OR, and the other in Hanford, CA—the lines demarcating 
the project area were drawn over seeming identical lines that represented city streets. The 
superimposition of these two seemingly by identical lines, and the difference in what they 
represent, illustrates something key about how maps impart meaning. On a city map, the lines 
that represent streets define possible paths of movement for human drivers and pedestrians. The 
lines representing abatement project areas, on the other hand, represent possible boundaries, or 
walls, that are meant to obstruct crows’ movement and shape their roosting location. In this 
chapter, I will ask the questions: How do mapped lines—be they paths or walls—do something 
in the present for the sake of a possible future? How can a line on map come to represent either a 
path or a wall? How does placing maps in continuity with crow roosts reveal a world that is 
made and remade through layers of contested representations? 
To parse the differences between paths and walls represented as lines on a map, we can 
situate maps in a semiotic process that will highlight the different kinds of signs in whose 
relations mapped lines become meaningful. As detailed in chapter one, the different kinds of 
signs to which I will refer are icons, indices, and symbols. Each kind of sign describes a 
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particular relationship between a vehicle, such as a mapped line, and an object, such as the street 
that that line represents. Put briefly, iconic signs mark a relation of “likeness” or “resemblance” 
between vehicle and object, like a digital recording of hawk call that sounds like the call of a 
living hawk. Indexical signs involve vehicles that point towards their objects through contiguity, 
like a footprint in the sand pointing towards the former presence of a foot by marking its 
negative contour as it had been impressed into the sand. Symbolic signs will be important in this 
chapter because, as I will argue, it is how symbolic signs work that enables mapped lines to be 
paths, in one case, and walls in another. Unlike iconic and indexical signs, there is nothing 
inherent to a line on a map that makes it a path or a wall. A line marking a wall and a line 
marking a path are iconic, in that the form of one resembles the form of another. To make the 
distinction between them is to understand how, through an arbitrary association, upheld and 
defined by the convention of a linguistic system, certain lines are made to symbolize paths and 
others walls.  
Shifting our discussion from iconic and indexical signs—which both humans and crows 
interpret—to symbolic signs—which according to Kohn and Deacon only become meaningful to 
humans—we can open our discussion to something that we had bracketed off in chapter one: 
context.2 In centering this chapter around lines on maps, I will open up the contexts that can help 
us understand how maps are used in falconry-based bird abatement. The first is the context of 
cartographic representation as a form of knowledge that can produce and define paths and walls. 
We will enter this context by working through the use of maps as a process of semiosis, in which 
the interplay of iconic, indexical, and symbolic signs come to impart cartographic meaning to 
human interpreters and project a field of possibility for future action. In typical city maps, I will 
                                                 
2
 For extended argument about the human capacity to understand symbolic reference see Deacon (1997). For 
Eduardo Kohn’s discussion of symbols and their relation to ethnographic context, see Kohn (2013, 38-42).  
47 
 
 
argue, future action is the capacity to navigate the paths of movement along streets that the maps 
make legible. We will then ask how a project area emerges as a result of the semiotic process of 
making and understanding maps. Here, we can contrast the lines that represent paths with the 
project area that represents boundaries. This will open us up to the debates about the politics of 
cartography and the alignment of power that enables lines to become paths and walls. In 
falconry-based bird abatement such political alignments are, I argue, important to humans 
preventing crows from roosting in particular areas. 
Our riddle—how a line on a map became a line of crows—takes on new form in this 
chapter. In chapter one, I argued that crow roosts could be understood as representations of a city 
made by crows in terms of roostability. To do so was to denaturalize crow roosts by thinking of 
them in terms representation, terms normally limited to descriptions of human practice. The 
challenge with maps is different. They are clearly forms of representation, used ubiquitously for 
marking boundaries and paths. My goal, therefore, will be to make maps, and the people who use 
them, appear strange by situating their use in falconry-based bird abatement. I will denaturalize 
maps just as I denaturalized crow roosts each as representations that do not so much reflect as 
transform the world. In doing so, I hope to reveal a world stitched with tangling representations, 
contested, knotted, and, sometimes—as when a line on a map becomes a line of crows—
intentionally woven together. 
Patrol Routes 
One November evening in Hanford California, I set out with Elijah and his hawk Mars at 
the beginning of their shift during which they were to patrol the project area and harass all of the 
crows found roosting within its perimeter. Darkness had just settled and with it thousands of 
crows had settled too, perched on trees, buildings, and telephone wires to rest until morning.  
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Before meeting Elijah, I had followed a small group of crows as they left their foraging site at an 
industrial slaughterhouse several miles outside of Hanford in a desert of flat fields. The crows 
guided me towards Hanford straight as the crow flies, but sometimes nearly lost me by taking 
routes that did not align with the roads below. As we approached the city by road and sky, the 
group was joined by other crows all maintaining their steady, straight flight towards the city. 
Once amidst the closely packed buildings, I drove around trying to catch glimpses of the 
thousands of crows converging on the city and cawing loudly as they convened in preliminary 
groups before taking flight again to find their quiet roost for the night.3 When I met Elijah, 
darkness had fallen and he was planning out the night’s shift with another falconer named Bruno. 
They were both looking at Elijah’s phone, on which was displayed a digitized city-map of 
Hanford—almost identical to the map I used to find the address at which I was to meet Elijah, 
except, as I was to learn later, a red line had been added to Elijah’s map to mark the boundaries 
of the abatement project area. With this map as reference, they planned their patrol routes: Elijah 
was to patrol the south western part of the project area before heading north and then east. Bruno 
was to patrol the eastern part in the same manner. Through this division of movement, they 
would, by the end of the night, have patrolled the entire project area, block by block.  
Elijah led me south and then west towards the Hanford train station, a place we had 
observed to be one of the major nocturnal roosting sites.4 We wandered systematically towards 
our destination via a circuitous route, taking detours through alleys, doubling back, scouring 
deep parking lots, all the while checking the rooftops and trees for roosting crows. As we 
                                                 
3
 When congregating at their winter roosting site, crows first convene in a pre-roost gathering, called a “staging 
area,” during which they caw loudly, perhaps exchanging information, before quietly departing to a final roosting 
location to spend the night.   
4
 This is the same train station in which, on the first night I met Elijah, I had mistaken a recorded predator call for an 
actual bird call (see chapter one).  
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wandered, Mars flew from perch to perch, sometimes buildings, or street lights, or telephone 
wires, whatever he could grab onto with his talons. Whenever Mars anticipated the direction of 
our movement, Elijah called Mars to his glove, by raising his arm holding a piece of raw meat in 
his gloved hand. He was trying to train Mars to fly ahead of him as he walked and, to encourage 
this behavior, he gave Mars an edible reward every time he flew ahead of us. We reached the 
train station parking lot and looked up into the trees that adorned the lot and the roof that capped 
the station, but did not see any crows. “Crows can be camouflaged against the night sky or out of 
view on a roof,” Elijah said, “but you can always tell where they’ve been roosting because of 
what they leave behind.” He pointed to the white speckled shapes decorating the dark pavement 
just below the trees, shapes that looked like the white inversion of the trees’ shadows cast at high 
noon. “The poop is a problem and that’s part of the reason we get hired. But it’s also helpful for 
doing this kind of work because it tells us where exactly the crows like to roost.”  
Elijah took a laser pointer out of the satchel strapped to his side and pointed the laser at 
the apex of the triangular roof covering the station building. Mars saw the laser and, as he had 
been trained to do, flew to the roof and perched where the laser point had shone. As soon as 
Mars was airborne, I heard other sets of wings flapping in the sky. Elijah pointed the laser to a 
slightly lower point on the roof, but a point which was brightly lit by a street light. Mars flew to 
it. Moments later, we heard the first caw. With this vocalization—which Elijah explained was a 
crow alarm call—the sky above us welled up with crows, cascading their outcries onto the 
intruding hawk.5 Mars, according to Elijah, was unfazed by the crows’ mobbing behavior, by 
which a wild hawk might be more intimidated. But, then again, a wild hawk would not intrude 
                                                 
5
 This behavior is known as mobbing behavior.  
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upon a crow roost in darkness.6 The crows circled for a few minutes while we stood watching. “I 
want the crows to get a good, long look at Mars so that they can start to associate this station 
with danger.” After some time, Elijah aimed the laser beam into the mass of crows circling above 
and repeatedly drew a laser-line back and forth in the sky. The crows responded by changing the 
course of their circling to avoid the laser. A large number of them flew away to land on a roof a 
hundred feet or so to the west. The remaining crows shifted their movements and their focus 
from Mars to circle instead directly above us. A few individual crows descended from the mass 
of moon-lit and street-lit wings to fly more closely by us, fixing one eye, it seemed to me, 
directly on our faces. “They’re getting to know us,” Elijah said, “and soon, if they haven’t 
already, they’ll recognize our faces as being associated with intruding hawks.”7 We became, in 
that moment, hawk associates.8  
The remaining crows who circled above us eventually moved off to settle with the rest of 
the group on the roof to the west. Elijah plucked a bit of raw quail meat from a plastic container 
in his satchel and held it in his raised glove. Mars, seeing the signal, flew down from the roof, 
landed on the glove, and ate his reward. “Is that roof over there a good place for the crows to 
roost?” I asked. Ideally, he said, they roost in trees over a grass substrate so that their droppings 
don’t stain the pavement and their talons don’t tear up the roofs. But that roof is outside of the 
project area, so it’s better than roosting at the station.  
I asked Elijah if he could tell me more about the project area and, to do so, he took out his 
phone and pulled up the map that he had and Bruno had used earlier to plan their patrol routes 
                                                 
6
 Normally, a hawk would never encounter a crow roost at all because hawks do not hunt at night. Owls are the main 
predators that would intrude on roosting crows.  
7 For a visualization of this scene, see the cover page to this chapter, drawn by my dear friend Shaheen Beardsley.  
8
 It was after this that I told Elijah about the crows at the baseball field (see introduction). For crows’ ability to 
recognize danger in individual human faces see Marzluff et al. (2010). For the possibility that crows have the most 
fear for a human/hawk pairing see Swift (2015).  
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for the night. “Here is where we met earlier tonight,” he said, spreading two fingers on the screen 
to zoom into an intersection labeled Lacy St. and N. Irwin St. “That’s right in the middle of the 
project area.” He pinched his fingers on the screen to zoom out to reveal a mapped image of the 
entire city cut through with the red line of the project area. “Bruno should be somewhere over 
here in the eastern part of the project area and will be heading south. We’re over here. This street 
Santa Fe, that runs parallel to the tracks, is the western edge of the project area. In a bit, we’ll 
follow it north,” zooming into the north western part of the project area, “to see if there are any 
crows roosting up here.” Elijah would, in the coming months, follow Santa Fe St. again and 
again, until what is a path for people becomes a wall for crows.  
Eye Movement 
 Navigational map are pictures we use to help us find the paths to get from here to there. 
But maps also have the capacity to transform a destination, over there, into here, before any 
substantial movement has been made. When Elijah pinpointed our current location at the train 
station and our eventual destination in the north, he did not describe one as “here” and the other 
as “there.” We were here, he said, and we would be going here. The difference between the two 
locations, both described as “here,” was where Elijah pointed his finger on the map, thereby 
shifting the focus of our gaze. When we looked at Hanford through its representation as a map, 
everywhere else in the city could become “here,” merely by shifting our gaze, no matter where in 
the city we actually stood embodied. With our attention on the map, the spatial distinction 
between here and elsewhere disappeared as the map revealed the routes on which we could get 
from where we were to anywhere else in the city. In that moment, the whole city was splayed out 
before us as an image, which, when interpreted, transformed the movement of the body to the 
movement of the eye. The ability of a map to help us navigate a city was predicated, therefore, 
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on the possibility of making a change in gaze represent a change of embodied location. When 
Elijah and I shifted our gaze from the mapped lines that represented the train station—at which 
we also stood embodied—to the area on the map representing the northern part of Hanford we 
represented, in a prophetic way, our embodied movement to this area. What seemed like a single 
representation, a map, was actually multiple, for it also entailed representing bodily movements 
with eye movements. By shifting our eyes, maps not only allow us to represent embodied 
movement in space, but also in time. Elijah, by describing where we had met earlier and where 
we planned to be in the future, illustrated that maps not only make spatial elsewheres into heres, 
but also bring temporal pasts and possible futures into the present through their cartographic 
representation.  
In this sense, navigational maps project a field of possibility in which short and quick eye 
movements over an image represent the larger and longer movements of walking or driving 
through a city. We can ask: what is it about maps that allow them to represent our embodied 
movement with the movements of our eyes? How do they convert the cities we move around in 
on the ground to a geometrical image, marked by labeled lines and coordinates, as seen from a 
bird’s-eye-view?  How does this image make the paths through the city legible from a single 
position? How does the imposition of a new line on a city map, the walled boundary of a bird-
abatement “project area,” open us up to talk about the walls and paths that score the political 
ecologies in which we live? And how do cartographic representations align with or contest other 
representations, such as a crow roost?  
A photograph of a river 
Questioning maps in this way, we can circumvent an impasse so often encountered when 
trying to understand the relationship between maps and the reality they are supposed to 
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represent. This problem arises when scholars uncover the power relations behind maps, which 
purport to be neutral descriptions of reality, by critiquing what critical cartographer J. B Harley 
called the “epistemological myth (created by cartographers) of the cumulative progress of an 
objective science always producing better delineations of reality” (Harley 1989). This line of 
critique is productive. It allows James Scott (1998) to show how the power of maps in early 
modern state formation in Europe rests not in their ability to represent reality, but in their ability 
to remake reality through its legibility as a cartographic image. They do so by abstracting and 
simplifying the complexity of the reality they represent by reducing it to a legible image. In 
effect, thanks to the power of the emerging states, reality can be remade to resemble its 
simplified form as expressed in its cartographic representation. The use of cadastral maps to tax 
the citizenry, for example, led to property lines, so often defined by curving boundaries 
connecting local markers and landscape description, being redefined over time to match their 
simplified, rectilinear representations on a map.9 Yet, as Scott argues, “the cadastral map is very 
much like a still photograph of the currents in a river (ibid, 46). It reduces the rushing, changing, 
and tumbling reality into a fixed and frozen image (ibid). While Scott shows that this frozen 
image—contrary to the epistemological myth of cartography—can never fully represent a 
tumbling reality, the benefit of a frozen image is that the tumbling reality becomes legible from a 
synoptic, or bird’s eye, view, such that an official observer in a state capitol can manage and 
record the taxing of the distant periphery of that state’s territory. The map’s simplified image of 
reality, therefore, enabled modernizing states to exert expanding administrative and managerial 
power over local knowledge by simplifying it using cartographic abstraction.   
                                                 
9
 See Scott (1998, 18-21).  
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Analyses of this type can help us explain how it is that the gridded streets in cities like 
Portland and Hanford came to be through cartographic logic in the context of colonial invasion, 
violent settlement, and urban planning embroiled in the emerging statecraft of an expanding 
American empire. Such reasoning might help us unpack one of this chapter’s central questions as 
to how boundaries and paths are made and remade using maps. Yet, there is a logic in Scott and 
Harley’s critique of cartographic representation that obscures something that I hope to dig into. 
The problem is crystalized in Scott’s analogy: maps are to reality as a photograph of a rushing 
river is to an actual rushing river. Like Harley’s epistemological myth, the analogy sets up a 
dichotomy between rigid, simplified representations, on the one hand, and natural, complex 
reality on the other. The analogy helps us dig up the power hidden behind the purported 
objectivity and neutrality of cartographic representation, revealing it as an unstable and 
untrustworthy description of reality. When we do this, however, we leave reality untouched as a 
stable and trustworthy ground. To destabilize an epistemological practice such as cartography is, 
in this case, to do so by leaving ontology as the unexamined ground from which the 
destabilization can be leveled safely. When trying to imagine how networks of crows, hawks, 
and people learn to represent based on the representations of the others, the world is no longer a 
safe and stable ground that members of different species merely represent differently. Instead, 
falconry-based bird abatement reveals a world that is, to the core, shot through with layers of 
representations that constantly and contestedly remake it. If representations do, as I argue, 
change the world, then we cannot analyze faulty representations against the backdrop of a stable 
world.10 We must analyze the process by which representations and worlds constantly affect and 
                                                 
10
 This is not a novel idea in anthropology in regards to humans. Levi-Strauss (1963) argues that, through what he 
calls the symbolic function, the psychical can transform the physical and the physical can transform the psychical.  
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change each other.11 In the stories I will tell, Scott’s photograph of the river enters the currents of 
tumbling water that it tries to freeze. 
The representations making the world over can overlap and clash. When thousands of 
crows represent an area as roostable, it can contest, or cause a nuisance to, a particular human 
representation of a city a free from nonhuman interference. When humans use maps to represent 
a crow-free city, and use hawks to realize such a vision of a city, they are responding to and 
contesting the crows’ representations of their roosting site. In this chapter, I hope to reveal the 
relations of power among different kinds of representations, such a roosting site, a hawk’s meal, 
and an orderly city, so that we can see how the representations of some have the power to change 
the representations of others. 
Semiotic Alignment 
To understand the world that takes shape in falconry-based bird abatement is to grasp the 
world as a fashioned assemblage of contested representations, made by different members of 
different species, each as agents in remaking the representations and worlds of the others. 
Another challenge in telling these stories is to face how the representations of many species 
interact with and remake the materialities of which they are a part. People use maps to build and 
rebuild the material infrastructure of cities in a geometrical grid. Crows roost in these cities for 
their warmth and bright lights that make it hard for owls, their nocturnal predator, to transform 
the crows into a meal. The roosting crows represent arboreal adornments, electrical wire, and 
sheltering rooftops as perches. In turn, crows materially transform rooftops and sidewalks by 
tearing up shingles and coating surfaces with their droppings. This material transformation is part 
of what provokes certain people to draw new lines on maps and employ falconers to fly hawks in 
                                                 
11 I hope the following section makes clear that I am not proposing a constructivist worldview that sees the world as 
a blank slate for culture to project freely upon. For an explicit critique of such a position, see Haraway (1988).  
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the city, thus, in turn, provoking crows to alter the ways they relate to certain sidewalks, 
rooftops, and other substrates that they use to roost. How the world is represented matters, 
because through its representation, the materialities of the world are changed. Representations, 
therefore, cannot be understood as different ways of apprehending, however imprecisely, the 
same stable reality. Yet, at the same time, this is not an invitation to dismiss the world as nothing 
but representation.  
To find an analytic to unpack the layers of contending representations—and the 
individuals and groups who make them—without leaving the materialities involved in such 
semiotic processes untouched, I will build on and rework the concept of interpretants and its 
relation to a sign and its object. The trichotomy was put for by Charles Sanders Peirce and used 
later by Terrence Deacon and Eduardo Kohn.12 “I define a sign,” writes Pierce (1908),  
as anything which is so determined by something else, called its Object, and so 
determines an effect upon a person, which effect I call its interpretant, that the latter is 
thereby mediately determined by the former.13  
Peirce sets up a triadic relation, in which a particular part of an object determines a sign that, in 
turn, determines or effects an interpretant. Contrary to a view of cultural meaning as an 
imposition of order on a chaotic environment, this seems to suggest that the materiality of an 
object determines, through its mediation as a sign, its interpretant.14 In the case of human 
interpretants defining the materialities through cultural meaning, it seems that the determination 
or the agency of that meaning rests not in the top-down imposition from human minds, but in the 
materiality of an object and its mediation as a sign. As with all abstract schematics, however, 
                                                 
12
 In chapter one, we discussed signs as being the relationship—either iconic, indexical or symbolic—between a 
vehicle and an object. Here, sign replaces vehicle, and the relationship is not only between sign and object, but 
among object, sign, and interpretant.  
13
 See Essential Peirce, Volume 2, pg. 478.  
14
 For a culture’s ability to order an inherently disordered environment, see Douglas (2002). For a critique of general 
idea, see Kohn (2013, 153-189).  
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metabolic complications arise when we feed them specific examples. For instance, the object of 
reference represented by Elijah’s map could be said, on one level, to be the abatement project 
area. But this object has no materiality other than the line of pixels on a digitized map, which is 
not its materiality, but the material used to represent it through the mediation of a sign. Its 
materiality, rather, exists in a possible future, wherein it describes a not-yet-existing boundary 
between where crows do and do not roost. In this way, the object, a particular boundary in a 
possible future, determines a sign, a line on a map, which in turn determines an interpretant, the 
effect upon a person to imagine such a possible future. The idea of an interpretant is helpful here 
because it provides language to address not individual interpreters, such as Elijah, Bruno, or 
myself. Nor does it strictly refer to groups, such as falconers using maps in bird abatement. 
Rather, an interpretant involves thinking about the effects of semiosis on selves, such that they 
are rendered multiple. “[A] person,” writes Peirce, “is not absolutely an individual. His thoughts 
are what he is ‘saying to himself,’ that is saying to that other self that is just coming into life in 
the flow of time” (CP 5. 421, cited in Kohn 2013, 87). The term interpretant describes these 
other selves that speak to us by coming to life through semiosis. The concept, in my analysis, 
reveals that the possible futures to which project areas on maps refer, help to determine a 
position, in which an interpretant emerges as another self through its alignment with an object, a 
possible future, by virtue of that object’s mediation as a sign. The possible future of a project 
area represented as a sign on a map opens up a position from which falconers can emerge as an 
interpretant, another self, coming into being through this semiotic alignment so as to gather 
meaning about a possible future. Insofar as we entered this position when we looked at Hanford 
on the map, Elijah and I, as interpretants in alignment with a map and a future, came to life in the 
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flow of time as other selves who talked to us about a possible future in which crows roost 
differently (ibid). 
It might seem that, in foregrounding the object as determining the connection between 
sign and interpretant, I am suggesting that representations are determined by that which they 
represent. Terrence Deacon reframes Pierce’s idea of the determination of the object to 
foreground instead the mediation of the interpretant. “The interpretant,” writes Deacon (1997, 
64), “is the mediator that brings a sign and its object together. Differences in the form of 
reference are due to differences in the form of this mediation process.” Here, the interpretant—
or, in my terms, the position from which the sign and its object enter alignment—is vested with 
the power of mediation, the power to bring together the sign and its object. How the sign is 
brought into alignment with its object is the product of what form of mediation—iconic, 
indexical, or symbolic—the interpretant uses. It might seem from my excavations from Peirce 
and Deacon, that our options are to vest the power of determination in either the materiality of 
the object or the subjectivity of the interpretant. However, as both Peirce and Deacon note, 
objects of semiotic reference are not always nonliving material. In the case of the project area as 
a sign, part of what produces its object is a particular configuration of living crows, roosting in 
one place and not another. As we saw in chapter one, these crows are not material that stands 
waiting to be represented. Rather, part of what the project area aligns falconers with is the way 
that crows represent areas as roosting sites. The crows themselves are interpretants, bringing into 
alignment an object—what Elijah called a “good night’s sleep” —through its mediation as signs, 
including humans and hawks, in the area we humans might call a city (see chapter one). But 
these same crows are also themselves objects insofar as project areas on maps bring human 
interpretants into alignment with a future in which crows roost differently than they did before.  
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To make matters more complicated and to almost justify not using the terms of semiosis at all, 
crows can also be said to be signs. They are signs insofar as falconers will interpret their roosting 
locations, over the course of an abatement project, as an indication of whether the possible future 
represented on the city map, is entering alignment with the present roosting formations of the 
crows. 
The productive difficulty in using the terms of semiosis is that it can seem like every 
thing can be seen as an object, a sign and an interpretant, just as a sign can be an icon, an index, 
or a symbol, depending on our point of view. This is because semiosis opens us up to living 
process, which changes depending on how we become aligned within it, as well as orient 
ourselves to its study, as I am doing here.  Eduardo Kohn (2013, 33) captures what I mean when 
he writes that:  
Semiosis is the name for this living sign process through which one thought gives rise to 
another, which in turn gives rise to another, and so on, into the potential future. It 
captures the way in which living signs are not just in the here and now but also in the 
realm of the possible.  
Signs, Kohn argues “are alive insofar as they can grow” (ibid). This growth is the process of 
semiosis wherein interpretants bring together, or are determined by, objects and their signs so as 
to themselves become signs, connected to objects for yet other interpretants, and so on and so 
forth, stretching the semiotic chain from the past into the future, what Kohn calls the “realm of 
the possible.” These chains, argues Kohn, are alive, because they are intrinsic and constitutive of 
life on earth. Thus, while nonliving material may not itself represent the world, it is wrapped up 
in a living process of semiosis, by which all life represents the places we live.15 
                                                 
15
 The challenge here is to find where semiotic alignments are solidified in the living sign process. In other words, to 
see how this living sign process does not only imply flux, but a series of alignments that allows signs, or semiotic 
chains, to grow.  
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 I hope to draw from these discussions of interpretants, signs, and objects a particular 
analytic that, when reworked and amplified, can shed light on how and why a line on a map 
becomes a line of crows in a city. This analytic is what I am calling semiotic alignment, the 
“orientation” of “appropriate relative positions” for semiotic chains to take shape and grow 
(“alignment” n. 2019).16 I use it to capture the way that, depending on how interpretants, signs, 
and objects are positioned in relation to each other, the semiotic chains they continue, and the 
possible futures they open up, can change. This is a way of thinking about meaning spatially, as 
the product of alignments, but it is also a way of thinking temporally, because these alignments 
can bring pasts and possible futures together.17 It is also through such spatio-temporal alignments 
that “parties or powers” form “groupings...on the basis of shared ideological or political goals.”18 
It provides an analytical frame, therefore, to witness how semiotic webs bring political and 
ecological meaning together.  
I use alignment to point towards its constitutive opposite, misalignment, in which one 
representation contradicts or contests another. If we conceive of representation as a particular 
alignment of interpretant/sign/object, then we can clearly see when different alignments 
themselves align and misalign. Crows’ alignment of the city of Hanford and Portland as a sign of 
the object of a good night’s sleep, can clearly be seen to align, on one level, with people who, 
like crows, expect to get a good night’s sleep in the city. But the crows’ semiotic alignment 
misaligned with something else; people’s alignment with a city as a sign of human order and 
control over unruly life. The growth of semiotic chains or webs, I argue, is produced through the 
                                                 
16See definition 1.a and 1.b for “alignment” in the Oxford English Dictionary.  
17
 While it has not come up for me in this project, the idea of alignment is not only one directional, from past to 
present. Another project might ask how what Kohn calls the “realm of the possible,” not only refers to the future, but 
also the past. In other words, can thoughts grow against the progressive flow of empty and homogenous time?  
18 See definition 6. for “alignment” in the Oxford English Dictionary.  
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friction of misaligned representations.19 At the end of the abatement project in Portland, crows 
aligned with the streets—marked months before as the edge of the project area—as a sign of an 
invisible wall; while to people, these same streets were pathways of movement. On one level, the 
street as a wall for crows is aligned with people’s desire to rid an area of crows, but, on another, 
a street as a path for one entails a misalignment with that street as a wall for another. Thinking in 
this way also opens us up to the possibility for re-alignments to take place, not only the kind of 
re-alignments imagined and realized in falconry-based bird abatement, but also, more generally, 
as the possibility for making paths for many that are not, at the same time, walls for others.  
Aerial Advantage 
How can people use maps to make lines represent paths and walls? And how can maps 
conjure a future in which crows, who will never read the lines on the map, come to represent the 
mapped walls in their roosting formation? Maps lend themselves to my focus on semiotic 
alignment because maps are explicitly composed of a network of lines. As representations, city 
maps seem to be diagrammatic pictures, in that their networks of lines resemble, iconically, the 
network of streets that the lines represent. “Every diagram,” writes Peirce (1955, 105), is iconic, 
“even although there be no sensuous resemblance between it and its object, but only an analogy 
between the relations of the parts of each.”20 Whereas the digitally recorded hawk call from 
chapter one had a sensuous, iconic likeness to the call of a living hawk, a map is iconic, not 
through sensuous qualities, but through the proportional relations among streets translated into 
lines, a process which reduces detail to form an analogy between certain information of a larger 
scale in a smaller one. As Scott (1998) argues, the miniaturization that maps entail enables those 
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 My attention to friction as an image of generative contestation comes from Anna Tsing book Friction: An 
Ethnography of Global Encounters (2005).  
20
This quote from Peirce is from the posthumous Philosophical Writings of Peirce (1955).   
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who use maps to see the world as legible from a synoptic view. To read Scott and Peirce together 
with my idea of alignment, we can say that there is a semiotic process by which maps, as signs, 
simultaneously miniaturize the objects they represent and align interpretants with an enlarged 
and synoptic view. As the world shrinks into a cartographic diagram, the interpretant transcends 
bodily position to achieve the aerial advantage of synoptic vision.  
To enter the alignment of an interpretant, a map, and its worldly object is to leave the 
ground to enter an aerial position, below which the world can be seen from above.21 To be 
elevated to this position is to be given, by a semiotic process, an aerial advantage. When Elijah 
explained the project area in Hanford, the lines on the map did not resemble, as icons should, the 
way the streets appeared to us as we stood on the ground. Standing in the parking lot of the 
Hanford train station, the streets disappeared as they receded towards the horizon, or were 
blocked from view by buildings and trees. From the aerial position entered when aligned with the 
map, horizons disappear and, suddenly, the paths and proportions of the lines on the map 
resemble iconically the paths of the streets below. Maps point their readers, indexically, to a 
position from which they can look back and see the world as iconic with the map that represents 
it. Neither Elijah nor I were familiar with the city of Hanford, yet Elijah spoke confidently about 
where in the city we had been and how it related to where we were now and where we planned to 
be later. As I suggested earlier, he could refer to anywhere in the city as here, even though, in 
relation to where we stood, other parts of the city were certainly not here but over there. This 
aerial position is advantageous precisely because it seems to make the unfamiliar paths of a city 
familiar by rendering them as legible lines that allowed us to plan a possible future. As Elijah 
and I read the map, we emerged as interpretants, as other selves aligned with the city as a 
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 For more on the aerial view engendered by maps and globes, see Ingold 2000, 209-218.  
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navigable object in which every path appeared to be familiarly splayed out before us. To allude 
to the last chapter’s discussion of Jacob von Uexkull (1934, 102), the entire city transformed 
from a viscous medium into a more fluid one.  
City maps, then, form an alignment among an interpretant, a sign, and an object. The map 
is a sign that is determined by its object, the potential navigation of city streets. It is 
advantageous insofar as the map describes the streets sufficiently enough that interpretants can 
use the map to their advantage in navigating the streets of a city. The peculiarity of this 
alignment rests in the fact that reading a map entails a dissociative transportation from one’s 
body to an aerial position. This dissociation from the ground to the sky, from the body to the eye, 
enables eye movement to represent, in miniaturized form, the movement of bodies in space and 
time. Donna Haraway called this kind of movement a God’s trick, in which those seeking to 
make purely objective knowledge claims imaginatively transcend their bodily positions—which 
might make their claims biased or partial—so as to achieve an “unmarked” and “conquering gaze 
from nowhere,” a gaze which “claim[s] the power to see and not be seen, to represent while 
escaping representation” (Haraway 1988, 581).  
The advantage, then, achieved when entering the interpretant position determined by 
maps and their navigable objects involves the power to project a possible future—either of paths 
or walls—from a conquering position in the sky. In this particular alignment, the city streets are, 
of course, drastically reduced so as to become a sign that aligns an interpretant in an aerial 
position that expands the scope of vision. This cartographic sign does not align its aerially-
positioned interpretant with the city’s trees, rooftops and telephone wires that falconers need to 
survey to find roosting crows. As with all semiotic alignments, signs only take particular 
qualities from their objects so as to align an interpretant with a partial understanding of it.  For 
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this same reason, when I read directions on Google maps to meet Elijah in Hanford, a disclaimer, 
barely visible, put forth this same semiotic theory:  
These directions are for planning purposes only. You may find that construction projects, 
traffic, weather, or other events may cause conditions to differ from the map results, and 
you should plan your route accordingly.22 
To plan your route accordingly is to plan it under the assumption that uncertainty lurks behind 
the navigational plan projected by the map into the possible future. While Google Maps’ 
disclaimer might imply that this uncertainty is an unfortunate obstacle towards providing perfect 
directions, I will argue that it is precisely the slight misalignments between maps and other forms 
of representing cities that give map-users the uneven power to not only describe paths or walls, 
but to blaze and build them. Again, (mis)alignment is key. Falconers could project an image of a 
crow-free project area, when in fact thousands of crows were roosting there. The map misaligned 
with the crow roost, and this was emphatically the point. By then aligning the projected future, 
rendered on a map, with the nightly efforts of a team of falconers and hawks, whom themselves 
were aligned with the interest of people who paid money to hire them, a re-alignment of the 
crow’s roosting formation to match its representation on a map could take place. This re-
alignment took shape in the context of a larger alignment that drew into a semiotic web the 
representations of crows, hawks, falconers, city officials, business owners, a general atmosphere 
of distaste for the roosting crows, and a desire to be rid of them. This larger alignment of a 
semiotic web among several groups from several species, seemed to hinge on a map because it 
was through maps that falconers from abatement companies could show the people who hire 
them what they propose to do.  
                                                 
22
 See Google Maps directions (linked in bibliography).  
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In order to carry out abatement jobs, falconers had one foot in the human world of 
administrative pest control and the other foot in the world of meanings passed through the 
predator and prey relations of avian species. To bring the former world into alignment with the 
latter, human falconers used a map, which translates months of time, training, and power-laden, 
non-linguistic communication with both hawks and crows, into a single image, making legible a 
future to people who could not enter, as falconers could, the relational alignments that took shape 
among birds. It is noteworthy that the map aligns its interpretants with a metaphorical bird’s eye 
view. As a hinge between falconers and the people who hire them, the bird’s eye view seems 
especially useful. As will we see, it is partly the aerial movement of crows and the aerial view 
that comes along with it, that disturbs the people who walk and live below them. Tellingly, the 
bird’s eye view offered by maps becomes the lens through which people imagine regaining 
control over this aerial pest. The aerial vision of the pest, therefore, was used to imagine its 
expulsion. A typical wall, seen from above, from the crow’s eye view, loses its meaning as an 
obstruction to movement because it can be flown over. The wall that falconers constructed by 
patrolling a perimeter with hawks was strange: it was a wall that cannot be flown over.  
Paths and Walls 
The difference between a line on a map that represents a path and one that represents a 
wall can be understood by looking at the key to the maps meaning, its legend. In order to 
distinguish between paths and walls as they take shape on a map, we need to understand how 
symbolic signs relate to the iconicity between a map and its object and the indexicality between 
the map and the aerial view from which an alignment with this iconicity can emerge. The iconic 
relation between maps and their objects in the world is predicated not only on indexically 
pointing their referents to an aerial position, but also on how mapped lines can be labeled and 
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framed using symbolic signs of human language. “All semiosis,” argues Kohn (2013, 51), 
“ultimately relies on the transformation of more complex signs into icons.” This is particularly 
true with maps. The dissociative transformation from grounded human body to bird’s eye view 
was one such complicated indexical sign that was transformed, almost made invisible, by the 
iconic reading of the map that it enabled. Another is the legend.  
Adorning all maps, legends are key symbolic signs with which people can differentiate 
what exactly a particular line is supposed to represent. Without a legend, using a map to plan a 
navigational route would be nearly impossible. A legend tells its readers whether a line marks the 
boundary between two countries, or whether it is a road between two countries.23 It tells us 
whether a line represents a river or, sometimes at the same time, a border, or, coterminously, a 
water highway.24 The legend specifies the alignment of an interpretant to the lines on a map and 
their objects in the world, even if these objects only exists in a conjured future, as is the case 
with a bird-abatement project area. Yet there are also invisible legends, implicit instructions that 
are not apparent on the surface of the map but are integral for projecting future movement or 
barriers. These implicit instructions link and align maps with other forms of governing borders 
and paths. Understanding, for instance, that one line represents the border between the U.S. and 
Mexico, while another line represents a road between the two countries, does not prepare anyone 
for the uneven treatment one will receive crossing the border based on what passport one has. 
What is represented as a path on a map, may in fact be a wall, as represented by border security 
regulation.  
                                                 
23
 For a somewhat slightly related discussion of how maps form national identity, see Anderson (1983).  
24
 For waterways as paths in the British colonization of and sense of belonging to America, as well as the violent 
removal of indigenous peoples from the East Coast, see Drake (2011). For contemporary mapping practice of 
symbolic walls and barriers, see Monmonier (2010).  
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In bird abatement, the alignment of the legend, both explicit and implicit, is important 
because, depending on what the mapped lines represent will determine the kind of future it 
conjures. If the lines represented streets, then they enabled Elijah and I to align ourselves with a 
future—as well as a past, as Elijah also described where we had been—in which we could plan a 
route along the lines that corresponded to navigable streets in the city. If the line represented a 
project area, then the possible future it aligned us with would be different. To get at this 
difference, I argue that maps not only project a possible future, but also project a set of symbolic 
instructions for how that future might take shape. Navigational maps project possibility by 
pointing us towards a synoptic view from which eye movements find the routes from anywhere 
on the map to anywhere else. But these eye movements are constrained by their instructions, 
which stipulate only using the lines registered by name on the map to plan the route. The 
parameters that limit the number of possible paths, are, at the same time, what gives linear 
possibility to the projected future of moving from here to there.25  Similarly, project areas on 
maps conjure a future in which crows roost differently. The possibility of realizing such a future 
is predicated on the instructions embedded in the line being specified, symbolically, as a project 
area. Once understood as a proposed boundary for crows, the line instructs falconers to patrol 
certain areas and not others. The understanding of these instructions underlay the conversation 
between Elijah and his partner falconer Bruno at the beginning of the night, during which they 
planned their patrol routes—using other lines as paths—so as to ensure they covered all the 
ground within the boundary line. The visible and invisible instructions embedded in 
understanding lines as walls and paths, therefore, are key to carrying out their jobs. 
                                                 
25
 For more on how constraints on possibility enable the emergence of a new dynamic, see Kohn (2013, 54, 159, 
179).  
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How do humans enter into an alignment with maps and their objects so as to register the 
symbolic instructions for defining paths and walls? To do so is to use a different kind of semiotic 
reference than the resemblances of icons, and the contiguity of indices. Iconic and indexical 
connections can break down when the connection between the sign-vehicle and object no longer 
supports its resemblance or contiguity.26 They would have trouble conjuring a future which 
differs so drastically with the present as does the project area when it is first drawn on a map, for 
there could be no likeness or contiguity to hold a semiotic connection together. Thus, part of the 
semiotic alignment requires bringing to bear symbolic meaning on how lines can represent and 
conjure a future of paths or walls.  
Symbolic reference is what, according to Deacon and Kohn, enables linguistic signs to 
impart meaning. The semiotic objects referred to by the word “street” and the phrase “project 
area” are not produced through a direct relationship, either iconic or indexical, with their objects. 
Rather, the words first indirectly refer to their arbitrary relation to other signs in a linguistic 
system and, through this relation, indirectly point towards their objects of reference (Kohn 2013, 
53-56). As Kohn (ibid, 55) argues, these two layers of indirect, or indexical, relations that give 
symbols their meaning also enables symbols “to retain referential stability even in absence of 
their objects.” I can be inside a house, for instance, and understand the object referred to by the 
word “street” without someone having to point towards the street outside. While this might 
suffice for “street,” the phrase “project area” is, in bird abatement, more than the dictionary 
definition of the two words would reveal. The legend on Elijah’s map that defines a red line as 
the “project area” cannot be used to conjure a future boundary unless its interpretant is aligned 
with the phrase’s indirect relation to the practice and protocol of falconry-based bird abatement. 
                                                 
26
 See chapter one as well as Deacon (1997, 74). 
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It is through this alignment with a series of indirect connections to conventions of language and 
protocols of bird abatement that falconers can glean the explicit and implicit instructions 
delivered by the line of a project area on a map so as to achieve a conjured future in which crows 
roost outside of a wall that cannot be flown over. 
Semiotic alignment is an image-making analytic. It helps us imagine the many layered 
alignments—misaligned and realigned—involved in the transformation of a line on a map into 
the edge of a crow roost in a city. It also leads me to treat this transformation as an opening, as a 
concise example through which to enter a world where we find a contested display of urban 
managerial regimes, practices of cartography, and material alterations together with crows, 
falconers, and hawks. Falconers are positioned as mediators between two misaligned 
representations—the city as a roosting site and the city as ordered human space. In Hanford and 
Portland, Falconers used a line on a map to represent a wall in a possible future where a crow 
roost aligned with ordered image of urban space. Maps, I argued, can represent a wall in a 
possible future because of the semiotic process whereby mapped lines refer to their objects 
symbolically—even though many icons and indices are involved—so as to achieve a referential 
stability that enables them to represent a future which differs so drastically with the present. To 
bring this imagined realignment into existence—to build the wall that had been drawn as a line 
on a map—Elijah did not use brick and mortar. Instead, he used his relationship with a hawk to 
tap into the nonlinguistic semiotic processes through which crows determine where to roost. In 
doing so, he could build a wall by walking, night after night, with a hawk. Elijah walked the line; 
between human and bird, between hawk and crow, between language and nonlinguistic semiosis, 
between hunter and manager. He walked the line between the project area and the rest of the city 
and, in doing so, built a wall that could not be flown over. 
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_________________________THREE__________________________ 
_______________A trainer who learns to be trained_______________ 
 
 
Trainer, trainee, and the act of (un)training 
 It was getting late. Elijah and Bruno walked ahead of me, each of them holding their left 
arms steady for the comfort of their perched hawks. They had spent the last several hours 
patrolling a 20-block area of downtown Hanford, a small city in Central California. They were 
part of a team of falconers hired to relocate a group of thousands of crows that come every 
winter to roost in the downtown area. As we walked, Elijah and Bruno discussed how training 
birds had affected them. “I had to change so much about myself,” said Elijah, “in order to train 
my first birds. You go into it thinking that you’re gonna train a bird, but really, the bird ends up 
training you.” Bruno nodded. Extreme patience and consistency, they told me, were essential 
qualities that they had to learn to exhibit in order to build the trust required to train birds to, for 
example, eat while perched intimately on their gloved hand. To learn to exhibit new qualities is 
to unlearn their opposites. Falconers must unlearn impatience and inconsistency. Hawks must 
unlearn their inclination to eat alone. Training a bird, therefore, is as much about untraining as is 
it about training; it is as much about training as it is about being trained.  
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As Elijah and Bruno told me, training is not to be taken for granted as an unequivocal act 
of one changing the behavior of another. Unpacking this reveals two interpretant positions, 
trainer and trainee, brought into power-laden relation.1 The tense and shifting roles between 
trainer and trainee encapsulate the world as I tried to describe it in the previous chapter, as a 
fashioned assemblage of contested representations, made by different members of different 
species, each as agents in remaking the representations and worlds of the others. What can we 
learn about this through the paradoxical positionality that the act of training entails? It seems that 
falconers train hawks to associate certain behaviors with food rewards. But hawks, at the same 
time, train falconers to be patient and consistent. Or, put differently, the hawk untrains the 
falconer’s haste and erraticism. The act of training opens up an uneven structural relation 
between trainer and trainee, while at the same time, tilting the scales between the roles. 
 There is something to be learned here, and I suspect it has to do with alignment. 
Falconers are hired to use trained hawks to train pestilent crows to represent the city in alignment 
with human interests. In abstract terms, when two representations misalign, like that of a crow 
roost and a human image of urban order, a trainer is enlisted to re-align them. A trainer can be, in 
the Oxford English Dictionary, an instructor, a professor, a drill sergeant, a trellis, a piece of 
equipment, and—as I will argue—a nonhuman animal (“trainer” n. 2019).2 A trainer, therefore, 
does not need to be alive but does need to be in the position of authority or control; in effect, it 
can describe the agency of a nonliving forms—a trellis, for example, that trains plants to grow in 
a particular manner, or training wheels that teach humans how to balance on a bicycle. A trainee, 
on the other hand, is a human, animal, or plant. In other words, the trainee has to be alive. This is 
                                                 
1
 I use interpretant, as described in chapter two, to describe the structural positions in semiotic worlds. Here, I am 
suggesting that trainer and trainee can be defined through their semiotic alignment with meaning each has for the 
other.  
2 See definition 1.a, 1.b, 1.c, 1.d, as well as 3.a and 3.b for “trainer” in the Oxford English Dictionary.  
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because to be trained is to alter one’s representation so that it aligns with the representation of 
another.   
Thus, we see how the crows in Portland were trained by the nonliving urban 
infrastructure—its concrete warmth and electric light—to represent the city as a viable roosting 
site. In effect, their representation misaligned or collided with a human vision of urban 
infrastructure as orderly.  To correct this misalignment, crows were trained by cooperating pairs 
of hawks and humans—who themselves had trained each other—to alter their roosting formation 
so that it aligned with the representational line drawn on a map to mark the project area. In doing 
so, falconers untrained the lessons crows had learned from the urban infrastructure about 
roosting. By the same token, in altering their roosting formation, the Portland crows were trained 
into alignment with a broader human representation of urban space as orderly. In its broad arc, 
this seems to be another story that follows heroic Man as He struggles against the unruliness of 
Nature until He can exert power and control over nonhuman life (Tsing 2016, Crist 2016). To 
reduce a tale to its conclusion is to favor the victor over the fits and starts, the begun-but-not-yet-
finished, which crop up during the process of a conflict. In falconry-based bird abatement, we 
find unfinished business in the details by which humans not only train but are trained, and in 
which humans are not only trained but are untrained.  
This chapter will reflect on how the process of training and untraining both fits and 
doesn’t fit into the broader political and ecological alignments in which falconry is used to 
manage the problem posed by nuisance birds. These reflections can lead us into the problems 
faced in our current geological age and its contested name, the Anthropocene. How, I will ask, 
does the falconer become a figure, gripped by processes of (un)training, through which to 
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conceive of the Anthropocene differently? And how does the Anthropocene, with its demand to 
think on ungraspable scales, change our understanding of falconry-based bird abatement?  
To move towards this abstract question posed by the Anthropocene and the planetary 
scale it opens up, I will begin with local context of bird abatement.  In order to understand why 
falconers were hired to carry out pest control, we have to trace the human desire to rid cities of 
particular populations of birds. In what context, and in alignment with what other interests, ideas, 
and images, does this desire come about? And how does it come to affect the object of 
(un)desire, the birds themselves? I will briefly touch on a few debates that were articulated in the 
local media surrounding what to do, and what not to do, about the winter crow roost in Hanford, 
CA and Portland, OR. Through these debates, we will see how crows came to be understood 
through the figure of the pest in an urban landscape. Pestilence, I will argue, emerges in urban 
landscapes when one form of representation misaligns with another. In this case, human 
representations of a city as a controlled, clean, and orderly environment are upset by the crows’ 
representation of the city as a roosting site. To manage this pest problem is, in fact, to realign one 
species’ representation with another; to realign a crow roost with the human ordering of urban 
space.  
Falconers, as the agent enlisted to bring such realignment about, have one foot in each 
camp; one in the municipal practices of avian pest management and the other foot in the 
ecological relations through which birds interact as predator and prey and through which they 
interpret and act in an environment of human-dominated urban infrastructure. The figure of the 
falconer aligns municipal pest management with the ecological relations among birds so as to 
bring about a future in which crows roost differently. While, in the broad picture, this 
realignment seems to be another case of humans’ aspirations to expand their managerial control 
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over nonhuman life, a focus on the process of training reveals the potential for and the necessity 
of untraining. To (un)train is to question the top-down, one-directional control over the managed 
by the manager. I will ask how the figure of the falconer that emerges in such an alignment can 
serve to untrain our assumptions about management and its role in the Anthropocene so as to 
redirect our future action through an understanding of the world constitutively made and remade 
by the representational capacity of life on earth.  
The Pest and the Manager  
“They’re basically a pest,” one shop owner in Hanford told me of the crows. “They’ve 
kind of invaded the city...and I hope the falconers can take it back.” Crows are not inherently 
pests. When crows nest in small groups, as they do in the spring and summer, most people barely 
notice them.  They are interpreted as pests when, by the thousands, they descend upon a city to 
roost during the winter nights. The difference between being barely noticed and becoming pests, 
is not only a difference of number. It marks a larger shift of semiotic alignment by which 
interpretants, in this case the people of Hanford, align crows with the discursive figure of the 
pest. In a cultural imaginary that discursively structures the urban relations of humans and 
nonhumans, the figure of the pest places crows in an aberrant position at odds with the dominant 
spatial orderings of city life. 
Roosting crows are like dirt, which is a problem because, as Mary Douglas (2002) 
famously argued, dirt is “matter out of place.” “Eliminating” dirt, writes Douglas (ibid, 2), “is 
not a negative movement but a positive effort to organize the environment, making it conform to 
an idea.” In Hanford, to eliminate the crows is to organize the environment to conform to an idea 
of urban order, what Chris Philo and Chris Wilbert (2000) call an “imaginative geography of 
animals,” in which animals are divided spatially to adhere to and belong in an imagined 
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apparatus of humanly-conceived categories. These categories are spatialized—projected like a 
map into the geography of a landscape—so that the discursive divisions among them take on the 
physicality of a wall that can be transgressed through physical movement. When crows represent 
Hanford as a roosting site (see chapter one), they physically transgress these conceptual 
boundaries, which provokes people, in turn, to represent them as pests.  Writing about pigeons, 
Colin Jerolmak (2013, 226) writes:  
What people classify as ‘pests’ or ‘nuisance animals’ are in fact those species of 
‘wildlife’ that trespass on sidewalks and colonize human dwellings in spite of efforts to 
designate these spaces as human-only places. Their unwitting ‘transgression of our 
‘spatial expectations’ can be existentially unsettling because it is read as ‘matter out of 
place.’3  
A marked difference between dirt and crows is that one is inanimate matter while the other lives 
and represents. Because crows are alive, they can “unwittingly transgress.” It is the fact that 
crows are living agents that led to the idea that a several thousand strong crow roost was “an 
invasion.”4 People, then, use the figure of the pest to pinpoint animals that transgress human 
order by invading urban space. Crows are agents, here, in two ways: first, as I showed in chapter 
one, they are agents who represent the city in terms of roostability, a process of reasoning to 
decide where they will roost so as to increase their chances of restful sleep. They are also agents 
in a second sense: they transgress, invade, and disturb an imagined geography of urban areas. 
This second agency—that paints the crows invaders—is best understood as the result of a 
misalignment between a corvidian representation of the city as a roosting site and a human 
representation of the city as space fully organized by human control.5 The pest emerges through 
misaligned multispecies representations. The pest, then, is a discursivity category that is used to 
                                                 
3
 In this remark, Jerolmack is citing and building on Philo and Wilbert 2000, 22; Douglas 1966; Sabloff 2001.  
4
 See Johnson (2018). 
5 Following chapter one, corvidian is a neologism that turns the family Corvidae, of which American Crows are a 
part, into an adjective so that I can contrast it with the adjective form of human, as in “human representations.” 
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pinpoint a rupture in a dominant representation of a space, such as a crow roost in the urban 
order of a city, so as to set into motion its correction, the realignment of the roost with the 
ordered city, so that the former no longer ruptures the latter.   
To understand how crows enter the “imagined geography of animals” that people use to 
conceptually recognize and physically reorganize living aberrations in urban space, I will detail a 
few of the positions that surfaced in articles debating what to do about roosting crows. The 
debates can be broadly split into two polarized positions. One is best summarized by a comment 
to a blog article explaining a recent illegal poisoning of hundreds of crows. The comment read: 
“The only good crow is a dead crow.”6 From this position, the solution to the roosting crow 
problem is extermination, whether by poison or bullet.7 From here, realignment is achieved 
through disappearance. On the other extreme are several crow advocates that were opposed, not 
only to falconry-based bird abatement, but to the premise on which it was based: roosting crows 
are a problem. Their “vision,” as a website on the history of the Portland crow roost described it, 
“is to foster an environment of co-existence and wonder in our city, to project and treat natural 
phenomenon of our urban crow roost with the same sense of respect, curiosity, and awe as our 
swifts.”8 Rather than eliminate the crows or change their behavior, they sought to change the 
“imaginative geography of animals” through which humans demonize crows as pests but treat 
the four day stopover in Portland of the migration of the Vaux’s swifts—another bird—as a 
natural spectacle of wonder. 
                                                 
6
 Tisa wrote this comment on corvidresearch.blog. Note the disturbing history, not dealt with in this paper, alluded 
to by this comment’s connection to General Philip Henry Sheridan’s 1969 remark that “The only good Indians I ever 
saw were dead” (Mieder, 1993).   
7
 For extra-judicial poisoning of crows, see Swift (2014), Williams (2018), Loose (2018). For state sanctioned 
gunning down of crows, see Eiman (2015).   
8
 Portland Crow Roost (2019).  
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We can characterize the difference between these two positions—what I will call the 
dead crow position and the new crow position —in two ways: (1) in relation to corvidian 
representations, (2) in relation to human representations. The dead crow position yields a total 
change, by elimination, of the crows’ representation of the city as a roosting site. The human 
representations, or the imaginative geography of where certain animals should and shouldn’t be, 
remains unchanged. In this logic, realignment between misaligned representations is achieved 
through the elimination of one of them. The only training involved here is how best for people to 
kill the crows. A ‘new crow’ position operates in the opposite direction. The problem is not the 
crows, but humans’ representations of them as pests. Roosting crows remain unchanged, free to 
represent the city as roostable. Human representations, however, must undergo change so as to 
shift the crows out of the figure of the pest and into a figure of natural wonder, respect, and awe, 
the same figure through which people already interpret the Vaux’s swifts. By this logic, 
realignment consists in training people to think differently; to untrain their association between 
crows and pests so as to train them to represent roosting crows, not as pests, but as wonders. 
While these two extremes offer insight into how realignment of conflicting crow and 
human representations is imagined, neither describe the interpretive position from which 
falconry can be enlisted as a solution to the problem. The position that leads to falconry is not 
that of the exterminator nor is it that of the awestruck observer: it is that of the manager. Many of 
the articles I found, both about crows roosts in Hanford and Portland, as well as more generally, 
framed the problem and the solution in terms of management.9 Once the problem of 
misalignment between corvidian and human representations is understood as a problem of 
management, the solutions for realignment are altered. To manage is “to exert one's authority or 
                                                 
9
 See, for instance, Link (2005), Brittingham (2011), Williams (2018), Humane Society of the U.S. (2019).   
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rule over,” to “take charge of” and “to direct” (“managed” v. 2019).10 Unlike the trainee—who 
has to be alive in order to be trained, the managed—under the rule, charge, and direction of the 
manager—does not. Through management crows become at once an “object of analysis and a 
target for intervention” (Foucault 1978, 26). In the case of Hanford, crows became an object of 
analysis and intervention in the eyes of a group called Main Street Hanford, an organization 
charged with promoting and revitalizing the city’s downtown area. Through its efforts, money 
was pooled from local businesses and taxpayer dollars so that they could fund the 
implementation of falconry-based bird abatement to manage the problem of roosting crows. 
Through management, as one news article from Hanford (Johnson 2018) put it, “humans will 
rule the roost again.” 
Falconry, therefore, enters into alignment with municipal and local business interests that 
find roosting crows to be opposed to the revitalization of their urban center.  This implies that 
crows, when they represent the city as roostable, obstruct another kind of life that Main Street 
Hanford—and the interests it represents—was hoping to revitalize. When I spoke to the director 
of Main Street Hanford, she stressed that falconry was a way of managing the problem by 
convincing the crows to leave without actually harming them. This stood in contrast to a failed 
solution to the same crow/human conflict attempted by the Hanford Police Department in years 
past: the nightly gunning down of crows.11 The shift from zoocidal to managerial is the same 
shift falconers undergo when they enter the trade of bird abatement.12 Almost all of the falconers 
I spoke with had learned falconry, the sport of hunting wildlife with trained raptors, before 
realizing they could capitalize the art of their sport—training and being trained by birds. When 
                                                 
10 See definition 1.a and 3.a in the Oxford English Dictionary.  
11
 See Eiman (2015). This was also told to me by two informants.  
12 The word “zooicidal,” an adjective used to describe the killing of animals, was suggested to me by my friend-
turned-editor Thomas Gelfars. 
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they entered the trade, they shifted their role in the relation to prey. They no longer hunted in the 
same way.13 They chased target birds so that those birds learned to behave differently. Elijah 
described his job as “encouraging crows to roost elsewhere.” Leah, another falconer, used the 
phrase “persuade the seagulls to feed somewhere else.” Thomas said his job was to “convince the 
birds.” Each of these falconers, then, transformed from a hunter who used raptors to kill, to a 
manager who used raptors to encourage, persuade, and convince.14 
Shifting from hunter to manager, falconers enter alignment with broader and widespread 
managerial strategies for targeted control and intervention; from the management of resources, to 
the management of labor; from the governmental management of human populations, to the 
environmental management of invasive and endangered species.15 The figure of the manager 
seems to mediate many of the possible relations between people’s “imagined geographies of 
animals” and the animals who fit and do not fit in those geographies, whether they be humans in 
a population, or crows roosting in a city. This managerial mediation is powerful when it becomes 
the driving force that organizes and normalizes human and nonhuman relations. It’s power rests 
in its discursive parameters which dictate the stories we can tell. Like the hero’s journey to 
conquer the unconquerable, the manager’s quest is to manage the unmanageable. Both of these 
narrative tropes strive towards the same solution: the dominion of an autopoetic, self-contained 
heroic figure (Haraway 2016), or, more generally, the dominion of man over nature (Crist 2016, 
                                                 
13
 This is not true across the board. When falconers do pigeon abatement, for instance, they often trap and kill the 
existing population, and use their meat to feed the falconer’s birds of prey. Pigeons have a strong homing instinct to 
return to a place they have established “a liking to,” as one falconer told me. This predilection, once established, 
cannot be altered by falconry. But, once an existing group of pigeons have been trapped and killed, the regular 
presence of a falconer and hawk can successfully deter future populations of pigeons from adopting the same area as 
a roost, food resource, or loitering site.  
14
 A project not undertaken here might look at the effect that falconry-based bird abatement has had on the falconry 
practice in general.  
15
On populations, see Foucault (1978). For resources, species, and environmental management, see Agrawal (2005), 
who builds on Foucault’s concept of governmentality to coin the neologism environmentality to describe the 
governmental and state technologies for managing the environment.  
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Tsing 2016). “Think we must,” writes Donna Haraway (2016, 45) in her essay on Staying with 
the Trouble. “We must think. That means, simply, we must change the story.” The story of 
falconry-based bird abatement is already being told in alignment with the narratives of 
managerial control over previously unmanageable problems. The question is: how can we 
rupture such narratives while grappling with the force with which they are being told? While this 
chapter focuses on how human falconers are affected by and narrate their role as manager, it will 
end by asking whether other animals also manage humans and what we might learn if this be the 
case. 
Unfinished Business 
Falconry-based bird abatement tells the story of humans managing hawks so as to 
manage the problems posed by nuisance birds. The falconer is a human hero who journeys 
against the forces of nature to reign in the uncontrollable. As such, the falconer is aligned with a 
larger alignment of managerial control as the solution to all problems (Crist 2016). And this 
larger alignment situates us clearly on western coast of the heart of the American Empire. 
However, this larger alignment obscures something small that is both essential for bird-
abatement to succeed, and also something that can, if we let it, threaten the seemingly 
omnipotent role of the manager. “Of course,” Haraway (2016, 51) reminds us, “the devil is in the 
details—how to revolt?” In the case of falconers, hawks, and nuisance birds, the devilish details 
guide us towards new stories through which revolt might be possible. Hidden in the details of 
management via falconry, lurks a force that can rupture the architecture of management and the 
discursive hold it has on our stories.16 Falconers themselves, in “sympoetic” and power-laden 
                                                 
16
 I am guided by Anna Tsing (2016, 8). She describes the hidden force that erupts through “the virulent magic of 
the colonial embrace. The hidden force emerges from the very architecture of Man, with its life-world 
disengagements. The purer the rationality of Man, the stronger the hidden force.”  
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collaboration with birds, offer a way of rupturing that norm from within the belly of the 
managerial beast.17  
I want to rethink the relationship between manager and managed by thinking through the 
relationship of trainer and trainee. When falconers train hawks so as to train crows to roost 
differently, they do not only manage a problem of pestilent birds in urban space. They are, at the 
same time, trained by birds—both hawks and crows. When being trained by birds is swallowed 
up by the narrative of human managerial control over nonhuman life, it becomes our unfinished 
business. It is unfinished because, quite literally, the falconers’ job is never done. They must 
return month after month, winter after winter, to remind and retrain the crows that a particular 
area is off-limits. This business of training and being trained is ongoing. The wall cannot be 
flown over, but it is also never finished. It is business because the falconers are paid for their 
work in capitalist tales of urban cities, agricultural production, and waste management. But it is 
also business because, being unfinished and ongoing, it is a “difficulty” and a “fuss” (“business” 
n. 2019).18 
There is something special about the unfinished business that our grand narratives tell us 
is said and done. Unfinished business, as I construe it, is business that does not demand finishing. 
Instead, it is open business that can reveal new patterns of growth and new narrative tropes. This 
growth, I hope, will offer one means by which to untrain a one-dimensional reading of the 
regime of management. What follows, then, are the stories I gathered from falconers as they 
trained and were trained by the birds to think differently. This is, to quote Eduardo Kohn (2013, 
                                                 
17
 Donna Haraway (2016) guides us to shirk off “autopoetic” modes of storytelling, baked as they are in 
“methodological individualism,” and instead think sympoetically, that is, stories that do revolve around a heroic 
central protagonist, but act as containers or netbags that bring together groups of actors, human and nonhuman. She 
also asks how we can make new stories “here,” within the “belly of the monster, that is the United States in [2019]”  
(Haraway 1988, 581).  
18 See definition 12.b in the Oxford English Dictionary.  
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14), “an immersion into a kind of thinking that grows.” What grows are new forms of 
relationality between the roles of trainer and trainee, between manager and managed.  
One falconer, named Leah, will show us how when she flies her trained hawks and 
falcons, she becomes not only a predator, but also a prey. Thomas, a falconer working at a 
landfill in Southern California, shows us that falconers can tap into how different avian species 
read other avian species to determine whether the landfill is a safe food resource. Finally, Lisa, a 
retired abatement falconer, will show us how falconers can put on a dramatic play for an 
audience of seagulls.   
The sun was low over the ocean and projected a warm wash over the open-air top story of 
a parking garage on which I stood with Leah, on the terrace of a Santa Monica food court. The 
garage was slightly above the food court and provided a vantage point from which Leah could 
see all the birds in the area and from which, conversely, all the birds in the area could see 
Spencer, her Harris’s Hawk, who, at that moment, was perched on a street light in the middle of 
the lot. Seagulls were circling above Spencer, trying, as Leah explained, to convince Spencer that 
they were too intimidating to be his prey. Meanwhile, I saw high in the sky a small silhouetted 
form of flapping wings enlarging as it approached. Leah saw it too and she immediately blew her 
whistle and raised her gloved hand, to which Spencer returned. “That’s a peregrine,” she told me 
as she wrapped the thin straps, called jesses, attached to her hawk’s talons around her fingers to 
hold him tightly. We watched in silence as the peregrine falcon sailed on above us. She told me 
that other falconers’ hawks had been killed by the lethal stoop of wild peregrine falcons.19 
Part of training a bird, Leah explained, is being trained to read the environment 
differently. “You really start to associate with your bird and so you get a rush of exhilaration 
                                                 
19
 A stoop is a word to describe the hunting descent, which with peregrine falcons can reach 225 mph, to catch a 
prey.  
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when it chases after prey.” But you also tap into a certain fear, and here I’m paraphrasing Leah’s 
words, because you can see how your bird is vulnerable. Cars, glass windows, wild hawks and 
falcons, are transformed from what they were to become a potential danger to your bird. She told 
me that when she saw the peregrine in the distance, she could suddenly hear her heartbeat 
because her body understood her hawk to be in danger. In order to fly hawks in downtown Santa 
Monica, Leah had to untrain her established associations with the dynamics of urban 
environments so as to tap into their meaning in relation to her hawk. Windows became 
dangerous because her hawk could mistake them as the continuation of a path, rather than a glass 
wall. Peregrine falcons became dangerous, not because of how her hawk interpreted them, but 
because of how they could interpret her hawk as prey. To train a hawk to fly in this environment 
is to learn see the environment differently. A particularly avian vulnerability is revealed that our 
human positions do not make easily accessible.  
To manage the unwanted birds feeding at a food court demarcated for humans, Leah used 
a tool that was also alive. Falconers often slipped between the pronoun “it” and the gendered 
pronoun of their hawks: “she” or “he.” When Elijah told me about purchasing hawks from a 
breeder and investing in them as tools of a trade, he said of his hawk: “it is an expensive tool.” 
But because this tool lives, it can learn. And because it can learn, it can be trained. The same is 
true for the nuisance birds; they live and, because of this, can be trained to live differently. 
Sometimes falconers would address birds directly, as “you.” When falconers slip between the 
objectifying “it,” the subjectifying “you,” and the hybrid subject/object form of her/him/them, 
they seem to grapple linguistically with the difference between human subjectivity and avian 
subjectivity. This grappling emerges, moreover, in relation to a job that capitalizes birds as either 
objectified tools or pests at the same time as requiring falconers to treat the birds as thinking 
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subjects in order to succeed in their job.20 Thus, it is not a pathetic fallacy when Leah names her 
hawk Spencer and refers to him, not only to it.  As Spencer, a Harris’s Hawk, became acclimated 
to urban environments, he could train Leah to train him to recognize glass. But there were some 
things, and some hawks, that Leah could not train to learn the dynamics of urban space.21 
Through the tight association with a hawk, falconers glimpse an unfamiliar position in which 
they are, by association, both predator and prey. Armed with a hawk makes a person at once 
powerful and vulnerable.  
This intimacy, and the lessons learned therefrom, does not end with hawks. Essential to 
my argument is that the relation with a hawk opens falconers to a position from which to glimpse 
many other avian relations and to act meaningfully among them. At a landfill in Southern 
California, I stood with a falconer named Thomas on a bluff that overlooked the conical shapes 
carved out of the hillsides to make room for the burial of waste. Our gaze pointed west, three 
miles past the landfill to the cluster of glistening yellow that marked the solar reflection on the 
Pacific Ocean. It was around 11:00 AM, and we were waiting, Thomas informed me, for 
thousands of seagulls to flock towards us from the beach and try to feed on the open face of the 
landfill.22  Soon, just as he predicted, we saw the glistening of sun on wings as the seagulls 
advanced from the beach towards the landfill. The seagulls think this place is a buffet, Thomas 
told me, and they spread the trash all over the surrounding neighborhood while eating it. It’s our 
job, he said, to convince them that it’s not a buffet; it’s a place we bury trash. To show me how 
falconers solve this fundamental disagreement—of whether the landfill is a buffet or a burial 
                                                 
20
 For more on the use of pronouns in human/animal relations see Kohn (2013, 133-150).  
21
 She told me that some hawks can learn that glass windows are walls after slamming into them a couple of times. 
Others, however, never learned that glass was not a path. It also seemed that traffic was something most falconers 
said was always a danger of flying in urban areas.  
22
 The open, or “active,” face of the landfill is the term used to describe the part of the landfill where trash is being 
dumped before it is finally buried. It is this active face, kept as small as possible, that seagulls flock to.  
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site—we got in Thomas’ car and, his hawk perched on his arm, he drove us down to the open 
face in the chasm below. We parked behind a small hill, on the other side of which was the open 
pile of trash. The first few seagulls— “scouts” he called them—descended towards the pile. 
After telling me to stay in the car (for insurance reasons), Thomas got out with his hawk and 
disappeared behind the hill. From where I sat, I saw a group of seagulls fly up from behind the 
hill, squawking as if in alarm. Moments later, a group of crows, who had already been feeding on 
the pile, flew up and sounded their alarm. They circled just above, all cawing at what I imagined 
to be Thomas and his hawk. Circling high above this scene, the vultures and ravens seemed to be 
undisturbed by the commotion below. The rest of the large flock of seagulls, however, who had 
not yet descended to feed, did something strange: they did not descend. They hovered their flight 
higher and continuing their eastern course, flew past the landfill. And they disappeared in the 
hills beyond.  
The falconer’s goal here is to deter the seagulls, but there are several other avian species 
feeding at the landfill. Attuned to the layered relations among avian species, Thomas can utilize 
them for his abatement project. He told me that the crows, who I had seen moments before 
sounding their alarm, are helpful for deterring seagulls—even though the crows weren’t the 
explicit abatement target—because seagulls have learned to listen to the crows to determine 
whether the landfill is safe or dangerous. When the crows sound their alarm in response to 
Thomas’ hawk, the approaching seagulls are less likely to land. Using crows, then, can help 
falconers argue to the seagulls that, contrary to what they think, this landfill is not a safe buffet, 
but a dangerous burial site. While its aim is abatement, this example illustrates how falconers are 
trained by ways that birds train and untrain each other so as to tap into and intervene in its logic. 
Seagulls have been trained by crows to trust their alarm call as indicative of danger. When crows 
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sound their alarm in response to a hawk, seagulls allow crows to untrain their predilection for 
treating the landfill as a buffet. This is a type of training and untraining that takes place daily and 
is not permanent. Falconers have to be there seven days a week to be trained to understand the 
landfill as a buffet so as to maintain the human argument that the landfill is a burial site, not a 
buffet. To have a disagreement is to have an underlying agreement on the terms of the debate. 
Being trained to use a common set of terms, Thomas can argue with seagulls about what a 
landfill is.23 
Falconers are also trained by the relations between seagulls and ravens to find an 
advantage for their abatement goals. “Except maybe eagles,” said Thomas, “no one messes with 
a raven.” Because of this, if Thomas can train his hawk to chase a raven, which a wild hawk is 
unlikely to do, he can make his hawk, as he put it, “even more impressive to the seagulls. They’ll 
think, ‘if those ravens are being chased, and ravens are never chased, I better get out of here.’” 
Through his position as falconer, Thomas can be trained to enter a semiotic world in which 
meaning is fashioned and contested among avian species as they strive to represent the landfill as 
a buffet or represent each other as predator, prey, or a trustworthy sign of danger.  
Shadowing falconers at work, I found that they had developed a way of imagining avian 
thoughts that was both hesitant and confident; confident because they had spent so much time 
training and being trained by birds that they had built up an experience of how different birds, 
whether species or individuals, do and do not respond to certain signs; and hesitant for those very 
same reasons. “Seagulls are strange creatures,” a retired abatement falconer named Lisa told me. 
“They always act differently, depending on so many factors. [To do abatement work] you kinda 
                                                 
23 A possible future project would show not only how falconer enter the dynamic avian ecology that takes shape at a 
landfill but also how they lead us into the politics of landfill management, contractual agreements, etc. For more on 
these politics see Reno (2016).  
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just have to build your intuition and try things.” Her experience had taught that birds are never 
fully knowable. They are too different, day to day and bird to bird, to be understood in 
mechanically predictable terms. Birds are strange creatures. One of her intuitive strategies for 
deterring seagulls from a landfill in Northern California remains one of the most striking stories I 
heard while doing fieldwork for this project. Similar to Thomas’ predicament, the seagulls flew 
from the coast to feed on the landfill where Lisa was employed as a falconer. Sometimes the 
weather would be too windy to fly her birds, or they would already have had their full meal for 
the day.24 In such circumstances, Lisa would take matters into her own hands. The seagulls 
already knew that she and her car were closely associated with a terrorizing team of hawks and 
falcons. So, even by herself, her presence could elicit some fear in the approaching gulls. Having 
been trained, however, to imagine the world from the gulls’ point of view, she could go even 
further. She would take a thin, light pole, she told me in an interview over the phone, and attach 
to one end a disposable white plastic bag with red lettering on it. She would stand on a bluff, 
from which she could be easily discerned by the approaching gulls. Pole in hand and bag 
attached, she would wave the white bag in long elliptical motions. Then, as the seagulls got 
closer, she would start to add jerking maneuverings to the ellipses. As the seagulls came closer 
still, she would amplify the jerks and run back and forth as if chasing the bag. And then, bam! 
She slammed the bag on the ground and, jumping, pounced on it with her boots. She bent over 
grabbing the bag in her hands, and, turning to face the gulls, tore the bag in half. After stowing 
the torn bag and pole in her car, she would return to the bluff. Now alone, having finished her 
performance, she would stand tall gazing intently at the gulls to see how they would react to her 
performance. 
                                                 
24
 In order to fly a bird, falconers must use food rewards. If the bird is full, it won’t fly to the falconer’s glove 
because it doesn’t see the food reward as necessary for the moment.  
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The gulls’ reaction to this performance varied, depending, as she reiterated, on the many 
factors that make gulls behave so strangely. Sometimes they would be so hungry that they would 
descend to the landfill to feed, regardless of the terrifying gestures they had just witnessed. 
Often, however, after her performance, the gulls would slowly float their flight higher, cease 
flapping their wings, carried as they were by the thermal’s warm air rising from the chasm of the 
landfill. If they did this, she knew they had been “spooked” and so she would turn away from 
them and get into her car. In response, she said, the gulls, seeing that she was no longer looking 
at them, “would take their chance and fly away like there was no tomorrow.”  
Based on this description, it might be hard to understand what this performance by Lisa 
means. When she first told me the story, I was confused and had to ask: why are does the pole-
and-bag act scare the seagulls? She hesitated. “Well, because the white plastic bag with red 
lettering might be a seagull that is bleeding.” The entire performance, therefore, rests on an 
iconic association that Lisa imagines the seagulls to make. She imagines that they mistake a 
plastic bag for a bleeding seagull. In order to strengthen this iconic association between bag and 
gull, she waved the bag to mimic a seagull’s movement when fleeing from a pursuer. She 
pounces on the bag, not as a bag, but as a gull. When, afterwards, she looks up at the gulls, she 
trains them in her gaze: “They know I see them. They know I’m marking them as prey.” What 
happened to this bag/seagull, she seems to tell them, could also happen to you.  
I bring this example in to ensure that we do not misunderstand the falconers’ position in 
bird-abatement. This is not a position to romanticize as a part of a nonhierarchical symbiotic 
relation, in which humans, hawks, crows and seagulls become together and flourish. This is a 
position and a trade that is structured through uneven relations of power, managerial domination, 
and terrorization. My question still is, however, what can we learn from a person who has 
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learned to perform for birds, even if the performance is one of terror? I struggle with this 
question as an ethnographer. I witnessed falconers tap into and use a language so alien to any 
human language. Through fieldwork, I glimpsed how the world, as I understood it, could be 
transformed by noticing the transspecies signs that, if you learn to read them, reveal the 
sympoetic agreements and disagreements within and among avian and human worlds.25 To find 
out whether the semiotic position of the abatement falconer, and the transpecies signs that it 
reveals, can teach us how to understand or act in our current ecological and terrestrial crises, I 
will bring the falconer into the debate around the naming of our current geological epoch.  
Between a bulldozer and a scientist 
The name “Anthropocene” was proposed to describe the current condition of 
anthropogenic change and destruction of the earth (Crutzen and Stoermer 2000). Crutzen and 
Stoermer date the transition between the Holocene—the name of the former geological epoch—
and the Anthropocene as beginning in the “latter part of the 18th century... because, during the 
past two centuries, the global effects of human activity have become clearly noticeable” (ibid: 
17, italics added). The name marks not when human activity becomes a global force, but when 
the effects of that global force become noticeable; that is, no longer concealed. If the 
Anthropocene notices, through name, that human activity is responsible for a problem faced by 
life on earth, does it also notice or name a solution? For Crutzen and Stoermer (ibid, 18), the 
solution is clear: “An exciting but also difficult and daunting task lies ahead of the global 
research and engineering community to guide mankind towards a global, sustainable 
environmental management.” Through management, a small community will guide us towards a 
sustainable future. A new group of managers, therefore, will save us from the problems we have 
                                                 
25
 Haraway (2016) on sympoesis.  
Commented [BC3]: Link manager to trainer and managed 
to trainee. Perhaps with a diagram.   
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inherited from other managers. There is a critique to be made here, but we must also bear in 
mind the utility of naming a global problem as a human one. It forces us to look for whom and 
what is responsible.  
It is in conceptualizing human kind—the Anthropos of the Anthropocene—that we can 
perhaps best level a critique. “Mankind,” write Crutzen and Stoermer, “has now visited almost 
all places on Earth; he has even set foot on the moon” (ibid: 17) It is through this conception of 
a globally pervasive mankind that they propose future goals of global management. But what 
happens if Mankind is not, in fact, as pervasive as they claim?  
Into this conception of an all-pervasive Anthropos and the frightening and exciting 
Anthropocene, Anna Tsing intervenes. Her analysis could be said to enter the Anthropocene 
through a discrete qualifier used by Crutzen and Stoermer: mankind has now visited almost all 
places on Earth. It is through this “almost” that Tsing transforms the all-pervasive 
Anthropocene so as to “notice,” instead, the “‘patchy Anthropocene,’ that is, the uneven and 
unequal terrain of Earth stalked by Man” (Tsing 2016: 3). The Anthropocene, she argues, makes 
an “up-front reference to Man,” the anthropos, which is built from the “Enlightenment figure 
Man,” who, although “a white Christian male,” claims “generality” and universality (ibid: 2-3). 
Man proliferates to be everywhere, to be universal. Yet, he has not been everywhere, not quite; 
he is only almost everywhere. How, then, does Tsing “cut” Man down “to size” (ibid: 3) to 
show how his claimed pervasiveness has limits? Through “anthropological multiplicities,” 
Tsing “breaks up the imagined unity of the Anthropocene,” the imagined universality of Man 
(ibid). In doing so, “‘patches’ of difference emerge, forcing heterogeneities into its calculations” 
(ibid). To understand the Anthropocene as patchy is to change what we mean by Man and His 
relation to the global. Tsing (ibid, 14) writes that 
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a truly global Anthropocene is the one in which we are all already dead, through 
environmental crisis. That we live speaks to patches of livability among new forms of 
death. The conceptual impasse, then, is what we have to live in. 
We cannot live in a totalizing Anthropocene, because the logic of Man is one in which life 
worlds are destroyed. Yet, at the same time, we can no longer think of human activity as separate 
from the world it acts in, because, as the name Anthropocene tells us, our local actions have 
global effects. Naming humanity as a global threat is double edged. It helps us pin responsibility 
for the ecological catastrophes we face, but it also situates the hubris that led to those 
catastrophes as the same hubris that will save us through responsible global management. The 
stories told are generated through the figure of the manager, as a group of expert humans that 
will guide the rest of us, along with the entire world, towards a livable future. Our ability to 
narrate the precarity of our current epoch is constrained by what Eileen Crist (2016) calls the 
“poverty of our nomenclature,” that is, our discursive inability to tell stories without relying on 
figures which dominate the earth, be it through explicit violence or managerial sustainability.  
 How do the discursive possibilities posed by the Anthropocene change and are changed 
by falconry-based bird abatement on the west coast of the U.S.? The global Anthropocene 
demands that we attend to how Man and Managers erupt in local patches that undo the 
possibility for life. At the same time, it demands that we attune ourselves to patches of livability 
that erupt within the perceived dominance and pervasiveness of the Anthropogenic logics to 
reveal alternative possibilities for living entanglements to survive. In its broad arc, falconry-
based bird abatement seems gripped by the narrative of human dominion over nonhuman life. As 
a job that enlists falconers to use their knowledge of birds to smooth out the operation of landfills 
and farms, moreover, it also seems gripped by the logic of the Capitalocene, a spinoff of the 
Anthropocene which foregrounds capital rather than humanity as the threat to life on earth 
(Moore 2016).  
93 
 
 
 The odds, therefore, are stacked against me in finding hope for our global predicament in 
this strange solution to nuisance birds. Consider, however, that Anna Tsing (2016, 4) shows that 
the logics of Man are revealed by the “figure of the plantation,” which can only erupt in local 
patches of “ecological simplification in which living things are transformed into resources—
future assets—by removing them from their lifeworlds.” Within these local eruptions of Man, a 
hidden force can often be found unraveling these simplifying logics of ecological destruction.26 
Like plantations, falconers dislocate birds from their lifeworlds. But they do not do this through 
simplification. As the ethnographic examples of (un)training show us, falconers can only succeed 
in their work through an understanding of birds as strange and, going further, being trained by 
this strangeness to think differently. My question, posed and explored but not yet answered, is 
whether this mutual process of training, couched as it is within an eruption of Man, can lead us 
towards a hidden force that teaches us to think with different logics, and to tell stories that deal 
with but decenter the dominion of the managerial solution to our current problems.  
To understand the figure of the falconer, who trains and is trained by birds, I will put 
falconers somewhere between two other figures, that of a bulldozer and a scientist. A bulldozer 
is a “machine of replication,” as Tsing would say, because it destroys ecological entanglements 
to clear the path for new human designs. A bulldozer replicates Man. The figure of a scientist, 
detached and observant, endeavors to understand—without having any effect on—the ecologies 
that a bulldozer would destroy. Falconers do a little bit of both and, because of this, put us in an 
ambivalent position.  
But, by being trained by birds, falconers begin something that, rather than replacing the 
pragmatics of the Anthropocene (that is, naming a problem), can reveal directions to move 
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 Tsing uses the example of Fordlandia as a plantation within which the hidden force erupted (Tsing 2016).  
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towards a more viable future by stressing the capacity of humans to learn to be trained. To tell 
the stories of these futures Donna Haraway suggests, quite urgently, that we need a thousand 
names to decenter the heroic Anthropos and replace him with other figures.27 As one of those 
names, I suggest we linger with the strange managerial world we have “inherited from Man” 
(Tsing 2016).  Rather than dismantle the manager by renaming it using different figures, I 
propose we shift the frame through which we have been trained to understand the relation 
between manager and managed to see if, hidden within its own logics, are the seeds to its 
undoing; the seeds, as well, that might grow into new stories. It will not be a manager who 
manages the world that will save us. Rather, just as a trainer is trained, managers must, at the 
same time, be managed by what they manage. What happens when all management, including 
that of humans by other humans, is rethought in this way?  
The managerial position we should demand of ourselves is that which can learn to be 
trained to, as Tsing (2016) says, “not only notice” patches of livability “but endeavor to keep 
them in place.” To keep them in place is to learn to be trained by them. While it is a part of 
larger, Anthropocentric and Capital-centric logics, falconry-based bird abatement helps us to 
notice livability in the form of transpecies signs. To take this claim to the extreme, the managers 
we need are those that are not only managed. Patches of livability include many more living 
creatures than humans. In order for people in a city to manage crows, falconers had to learn to be 
trained by crows. In other words, the crows managed, in the sense of directed, the falconers by 
specifying the terms with which falconers could disagree with them about how they should 
represent the city when they roost in it. With a somewhat humorous register—but there is 
nothing more serious than a joke! —I would call this crowage, by replacing “man” from 
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 Haraway(2016) suggests the mortal gorgon Medusa, the Cthulu tentacular ones, the stories of Gaia, geostories 
and the earhtbound (Latour, 2013b, cited in Haraway 2016).  
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“manage” with “crow.” The world that falconry-based bird abatement opens us to is one in 
which the representations of many creatures, all those living in the patchy entanglements of our 
changing landscapes, are wrapped up in a process of semiosis that produces meaning about and 
changes within the worlds we inhabit. To better notice and to be managed by patches of 
livability, we can be guided by falconers’ ability to tap into and be trained by avian worlds. 
While the Anthropocene pinpoints human activity as the source of a problem, it can 
threaten to name humanity as the solution. To better understand the signs of our current 
challenges and the futures which we might find more livable, I suggest we endeavor to notice the 
worlds built from transpecies signs, that is signs that emerge through the alignment and 
misalignment of living entanglements. Our stories should be filled with managers and crowagers, 
as well as a multitude of other x-agers. What I mean by this is that the source of hope should not 
be the same as the source of the problem. If the plantation logic of simplified and disentangled 
lifeworlds brought us here, complicated and multispecies readings of the problem might lead us 
towards a livable future. To manage life on earth is to learn to be managed by life on earth.  
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________________________Conclusion________________________ 
_____________________Pieces and puzzles_____________________ 
 Finding my way into falconry-based bird abatement led me to the riddle that guided me 
through the chapters of this project: how did a line on a map become a line of crows? The riddle 
was helpful because it crystalized the entwinement of so many pieces of so many cultural and 
ecological puzzles. I treated the riddle as an entrance that opened into a thousand questions, only 
some of which I was able to address. These questions have not led me to a dead end and so to 
conclude them is tricky.  
 The riddle has taken us from the representations of roosting crows in Hanford and 
Portland to the global predicament that faces life on earth in the Anthropocene. In chapter one, I 
tried to show how crows represent cities when they roost. When falconers are hired to intervene, 
I asked how they can learn to say ‘no roosting here’ without using human language. In doing so, 
we saw how semiotic chains grow among species living contestedly together in urban 
environments. We also saw how those chains can break down as semiotic connections are re-
evaluated and re-presented. In chapter two, I asked how falconers can use maps, along with their 
ability to tap into avian worlds, to build a wall that cannot be flown over. This question led us 
into the discursive context of cartography and showed us how representations made by humans 
affect the representations made by other species. Using the analytic of semiotic alignment, I 
argued that layers of contested representations, not only affect each other, but the material, 
nonliving world of which they are a part. In chapter three, I asked how the semiotic alignment 
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whereby crows represent cities as roosting sites misaligns with a cultural representation of a city 
as orderly. In the same way, when seagulls represent a landfill as a buffet, they misalign with the 
landfill as a burial site for trash. From this, we could see how falconers were hired to re-align 
misaligned representations. To do so, however, they had to be trained by birds.  
 Being trained by birds, falconers invite us to reconsider what we mean by training. By 
managing pest problems by being trained by pests, they invite us to rethink what we mean by 
management. This is urgent, especially if the hope for life on earth is the sustainable 
management of the planet. At the end of chapter three, I suggested that: to manage life on earth is 
to be managed by life on earth. I do not know what this would look like on a planetary scale, nor 
even what it would entail on a local one. Falconry-based bird abatement does not offer a 
planetary solution, or even a local one. But what it does reveal an entrance into a way of thinking 
that might grow towards more habitable futures. Lisa may have terrorized the seagulls by 
transforming a plastic bag into a dying gull, but she also showed us that, contrary to what we 
may think, humans can perform for birds. If management can be rethought, we can start be 
reconceptualizing the relationship between manager and managed by noticing how falconers 
manage birds by being trained by them to think differently. 
 You do not need to become a falconer, or work in bird abatement to be trained in this 
way. I want to return to the crows in Hanford who recognized my connection to a hawk. When 
they addressed me as an intruder, they told me something about, not only myself, but my 
humanity. They read me as a hawk associate, a piece of a hawk, important only because of my 
connection to a hawk. When they did this they decentered the hierarchy that organizes life on 
earth in its relations to humans. Recognizing that I was a piece of a hawk decentered my 
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humanity, but it did not erase it. It placed me, as a human, in a subordinate position to a hawk. I 
became a piece of the crows’ puzzle.  
 To find a way to be managed by life on earth is to decenter the position of the manager. It 
is to treat the manager as a puzzle, but also a piece of other puzzles. Following these pieces and 
these puzzles may not lead to a unified image in which everything fits together. The puzzles are 
never finished but some of the pieces are in our hands. What puzzles might we fit them into? 
And who holds the other pieces we need?   
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